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Abstract
Recent years have seen a massive increase in illegal, suspicious, and malicious
traffic traversing government and military computer networks. Some examples include
illegal file distribution and disclosure of sensitive information using the BitTorrent file
sharing protocol, criminals and terrorists using Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
technologies to communicate, and foreign entities exfiltrating sensitive data from gov-
ernment, military, and Department of Defense contractor networks.
As a result of these growing threats, the TRacking and Analysis for Peer-to-
Peer (TRAPP) system was developed in 2008 to detect BitTorrent and VoIP traffic of
interest. The TRAPP system, designed on a Xilinx Virtex-II Pro Field Programmable
Gate Array (FPGA) proved valuable and effective in detecting traffic of interest on
a 100 Mbps network. Using concepts and technology developed for the TRAPP
system, the TRAPP-2 system is developed on a Xilinx ML510 FPGA. The goals of
this research are to evaluate the performance of the TRAPP-2 system as a solution
to detect and track malicious packets traversing a gigabit Ethernet network. The
TRAPP-2 system detects a BitTorrent, Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), or Domain
Name System (DNS) packet, extracts the payload, compares the data against a hash
list, and if the packet is suspicious, logs the entire packet for future analysis.
Results show that the TRAPP-2 system captures 95.56% of BitTorrent, 20.78%
of SIP INVITE, 37.11% of SIP BYE, and 91.89% of DNS packets of interest while un-
der a 93.7% network utilization (937 Mbps). For another experiment, the contraband
hash list size is increased from 1,000 to 131,072,000 unique items. The experiment
reveals that each doubling of the hash list size results in a mean increase of approx-
imately 16 central processing unit cycles. These results demonstrate the TRAPP-2
system’s ability to detect traffic of interest under a saturated network utilization while
maintaining large contraband hash lists.
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Performance Evaluation of a Field Programmable
Gate Array-Based System for Detecting and Tracking
Peer-to-Peer Protocols on a Gigabit Ethernet Network
I. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Billions of packets traverse government and military networks every day. Often,these packets have legitimate destinations. Unfortunately, the past few years
have seen a massive increase in illegal, suspicious, and malicious traffic. Some exam-
ples include BitTorrent illegal file distribution, suspects of interest using Voice over In-
ternet Protocol (VoIP) phones to conduct business, and Domain Name System (DNS)
data exfiltration. Recent stories include blueprints for Marine One being leaked by
a United States contractor using a BitTorrent file sharing program, the Mumbai ter-
rorists using VoIP phones to communicate, and Chinese hackers pilfering intellectual
property from Google and other United States companies [FOX09] [Kah08] [Wir10].
As a result of these growing threats, the TRacking and Analysis for Peer-to-
Peer (TRAPP) system was developed to detect BitTorrent and VoIP traffic of inter-
est [Sch09]. The system resides on a Xilinx Virtex-II Pro Field Programmable Gate
Array (FPGA). The first iteration prototype is limited in both processing speed and
by a 100 megabit Ethernet card, but still captures packets of interest with a “prob-
ability of intercept of at least 99.0%, using a 95% confidence interval and given an
89.6 Mbps network utilization” [Sch09]. These results prove the TRAPP system is a
viable tool worth expanding its capabilities to detect malicious network traffic.
1.2 Overview and Goals
This research extends the technology and concepts of the first TRAPP system by
implementing a more powerful FPGA and incorporating an additional protocol. The
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focus of this research is create a second generation TRAPP system, named TRAPP-2,
that is designed on a Xilinx ML510 FPGA board with a faster processor and a gigabit
Ethernet controller [Xil09]. The original TRAPP system detects the BitTorrent and
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) peer-to-peer protocols in real-time. For the TRAPP-
2 system, malicious Domain Name System (DNS) detection is added. Ultimately, the
research determines that the TRAPP-2 system is a feasible solution to detect and
track protocols of interest for law enforcement and intelligence agencies on gigabit
Ethernet networks.
The TRAPP-2 system meets four measurement goals. The first goal determines
the packet processing times for packets detected by the TRAPP-2 system. The second
goal determines the probability of packet intercept under a flood of packet-of-interest
traffic. The third goal determines the probability of packet intercept under various
network utilizations. The last goal determines how increasing the hash list size affects
the packet processing time. The two metrics used to measure performance are packet
processing time, measured in Central Processing Unit (CPU) cycles, and probability
of packet intercept.
1.3 Thesis Layout
Chapter 1 outlines the motivation, overview, and goals of the research. An
overview, background information, and related research on illicit traffic, network traf-
fic classification, network traffic obfuscation methods, current methods of detecting
malicious and illegal network traffic, the Substitute Database Manager (sdbm) hash-
ing function, and the TRAPP system are covered in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 explains the
method and experiments used to evaluate the performance of the TRAPP-2 system.
Chapter 4 presents the analysis and discussion of the results from the experiments.
The conclusions drawn from the research, real-world significance, and future research
areas are detailed in Chapter 5. Appendix A contains all of the experimental data.
Appendix B contains the pilot test data used to design and build the TRAPP-2 sys-
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tem. Appendix C provides a hardware construction guide to build the TRAPP-2
system.
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II. Literature Review
This chapter presents an overview, background information, and related researchon illicit traffic, network traffic classification, network traffic obfuscation meth-
ods, current methods of detecting malicious and illegal network traffic, the Substitute
Database Manager (sdbm) hashing function, and the TRacking and Analysis for Peer-
to-Peer (TRAPP) system. Section 2.1 provides a brief overview of the BitTorrent,
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), and Domain Name System (DNS) protocols and
their illegitimate uses. The methods of classifying network traffic are detailed in Sec-
tion 2.2. Section 2.3 covers some of the obfuscation and evasion methods used to
hide network traffic and data. This allows for an exploration of the current methods
of detecting illicit traffic in Section 2.4. This is followed by an examination of the
sdbm hashing function in Section 2.5 and the current TRAPP system’s capabilities
and limitations in Section 2.6. The chapter is summarized in Section 2.7.
2.1 Illicit Traffic
The Internet has evolved from a small network of sparsely connected computers
to an expansive web of millions. The rapid access to information, knowledge, and
current events has been paralleled with a proliferation of illicit data and traffic. Bit-
Torrent, VoIP, and DNS are legitimate protocols and services; however, they can also
be used for illicit purposes. Some examples include the distribution of illegal files us-
ing BitTorrent, terrorists using VoIP for command and control during operations, and
hackers exploiting DNS to exfiltrate sensitive data from networks [Kah08] [Van09].
2.1.1 The BitTorrent Protocol. The BitTorrent protocol is the natural
evolution of file sharing protocols [Coh08]. The BitTorrent protocol was created by
Bram Cohen as an alternative to the centralized file sharing programs such as Napster
and Gnutella [Coh08].
The Napster file sharing program was created by Shawn Fanning to allow his
friends to share and distribute .mp3 music files [Tys08]. The popularity of Napster
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exploded and became the preferred method of sharing legal and illegal music files
over the Internet. The Napster system relied on a central server, run by the Napster
organization, to point clients to the specific .mp3 music files requested. The server
acted as a mediator to set up the direct peer-to-peer connection between the file
downloader and the file uploader. The servers did not store or host any of the actual
.mp3 files being downloaded. It did not take long for record companies and prosecutors
to target Napster for the dissemination of copyrighted music. The central servers that
the Napster system relied on proved to be an easy target for the Recording Industry
Association of America and various music labels. Ultimately, the lawsuits forced
Napster to shut down in 2001 [Fel04].
As a result of the Napster shutdown, file sharing programs migrated toward a
decentralized approach. This eliminated the need for a centralized server and led to
the development of BitTorrent [Coh08]. In addition to a decentralized architecture,
the BitTorrent protocol implemented two new methods of downloading files. The first
method was to break the file into blocks of 256 kilobytes. This allowed downloaders
to accumulate different blocks, or parts of the file, and assemble them upon download
completion to create the entire file. As soon as a block was completely downloaded,
it was immediately uploaded to other peers seeking the file. To aid in the speed
of downloading, the BitTorrent protocol was designed to capitalize on the disparate
download versus upload speeds offered by Internet Service Providers (ISPs). The
downloader of a file was able to simultaneously download blocks of the file from
different uploaders. Since ISPs provided download speeds significantly greater than
upload speeds, a downloader could accumulate numerous smaller peer upload speeds
to match his download speed [Coh08]. Over time, the BitTorrent protocol has become
the preferred method of sharing files over the Internet due to its efficiency.
Currently, the BitTorrent protocol consists of two different protocols. The first
is the BitTorrent Tracker protocol which runs over the Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP). It communicates between clients and a tracker website to point clients to
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the peers sharing the requested file. A tracker website maintains a dynamic database
of peers associated with a file [Coh08].
The second, and more relevant protocol for this research, is the peer wire pro-
tocol. The peer wire protocol runs over the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
and is used to exchange the file pieces specified in the file’s .torrent file. The peer
wire protocol relies on the Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1) for file identification
and data block integrity verification [Coh08]. SHA-1, outlined in Request for Com-
ments (RFC) 3174, is a United States Government algorithm formally named as the
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-1 (FIPS 180-1) [RFC01].
The algorithm is designed to take a variable-sized binary input less than 264 bits and
output a 160 bit message called a “message digest.”
The SHA-1 hash function is used to hash the information dictionary found in
the .torrent file. The digest represents a digital signature of the file and its contents to
prevent confusing different files with the same file name. According to the BitTorrent
Protocol Specifications, “The peer wire’s protocol consists of a handshake followed
by a never-ending stream of length-prefixed messages. The handshake starts with
character nineteen (decimal) followed by the string BitTorrent protocol” [Coh08].
The decimal nineteen followed by the string BitTorrent protocol is critical for
identifying BitTorrent packets in this research. The next piece of information is the
20 byte SHA-1 hash of the information dictionary [Coh08]. An example of a handshake
message is dissected below [Sch09].
The client sends handshakes to other peers to retrieve parts of the file:
<13>BitTorrent protocol<0000000000100001101C9D63211C3C570FFBA
DD49C5649D3FB4972732D5554313737302DF39FFDC774B56A4C5352C11C>
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Line breaks and spaces are added to aid in readability:
<13>BitTorrent protocol
<00 00 00 00 00 10 00 01
10 1C 9D 63 21 1C 3C 57 0F FB AD D4 9C 56 49 D3 FB 49 72 73
2D 55 54 31 37 37 30 2D F3 9F FD C7 74 B5 6A 4C 53 52 C1 1C>
The first piece of information in the extracted handshake is the string length
of the protocol being used (0x13 in hexadecimal is 19 in decimal.) The second
piece is the protocol header, the ASCII string “BitTorrent protocol” which is 19
characters in length. The third portion consists of the reserved extension bytes
00 00 00 00 00 10 00 01. This is followed by the SHA-1 hash of the information
dictionary:
10 1C 9D 63 21 1C 3C 57 0F FB AD D4 9C 56 49 D3 FB 49 72 73
and finally the Peer Identification:
2D 55 54 31 37 37 30 2D F3 9F FD C7 74 B5 6A 4C 53 52 C1 1C
The BitTorrent protocol relies on the transfer of blocks of data that combine to
form the file being shared. As a result, these blocks are also run through SHA-1 to
ensure data integrity. The client performs a SHA-1 on each downloaded block and
compares it to the value in the .torrent file to verify the data integrity [Coh08].
2.1.2 The Voice over Internet Protocol. The Voice over Internet Protocol
(VoIP) is primarily used to make phone calls over the Internet [Sky09]. A person’s
voice is digitized, placed in a packet, and sent to the receiver on the other end. The
primary protocol used to setup, maintain, and tear down a VoIP call is the Session
Initiation Protocol.
2.1.2.1 The Session Initiation Protocol. The plan and protocol for the
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) was submitted by Henning Schulzrinne of Columbia
University in 1999 [Ubi08]. The protocol, approved by the Internet Engineering
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Task Force (IETF) as Request for Comments (RFC) 2543, centered on establish-
ing and controlling multiparty multimedia sessions [Ubi08]. The SIP protocol was
updated in IETF RFC 3261 and defined to be an application-layer control protocol
that can establish, modify, and terminate multimedia sessions such as Internet tele-
phony calls [RFC02]. The purpose of SIP is to assist in peer location in addition
to managing the connection once it is established. Applications such as interactive
gaming, media on demand, and voice, video, or web conferencing utilize the SIP pro-
tocol [Ubi08]. More importantly, SIP is currently used by VoIP providers Vonage and
Skype [Cis02] [Sky09].
2.1.2.2 VoIP Technical Specifications. Figure 2.1 is an illustration
of how a VoIP call is made using SIP. For clarification, Alice is calling Bob using a
Proxy Server that coordinates and routes requests between clients and servers. The
call also uses a Registrar/Location Server, which is a database of all the SIP clients
and SIP contact information within a network domain. Lastly, BYE and INVITE are
SIP specific request messages.
• Alice’s SIP client sends an INVITE request to her Proxy Server (1). Alice’s
Proxy Server notifies her that a call is being attempted (2). Alice’s Domain
Name System (DNS) server must perform a DNS lookup to determine the In-
ternet Protocol (IP) address of Bob’s domain (3,4).
• Alice’s Proxy Server sends the INVITE request to Bob’s Proxy Server (5). Bob’s
Proxy Server notifies Alice’s Proxy Server that a call is being attempted (6).
Bob’s Proxy Server must query the Registrar/Location Server to determine
Bob’s exact location and if he is currently signed on (7,8). Bob’s Proxy Server
forwards the INVITE message to Bob’s SIP client (9).
• Bob sends his ringing response back to Alice via the Proxy Servers (10,11,12).
If Bob is available, his SIP client sends an OK response to Alice via the Proxy
Servers (13,14,15).
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• Alice receives Bob’s OK and sends an acknowledgment directly back to Bob to
confirm the call (16). The session is now established and data can be exchanged
via the Real-time Transport Protocol [Cis10].
Figure 2.1: The Session Initiation Protocol Process [Cis10].
The steps of interest are at the beginning and end of the SIP-based VoIP call,
particularly the session setup and tear down. During the setup of a SIP-based VoIP
call, the INVITE request is used to initiate a connection from one client to another.
The INVITE request contains the SIP Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). The URI is
the address of the client on the network and follows the same formatting convention as
an email address (user@host). In the SIP message, the SIP URI is concatenated to the
sip: identifier. Examples include sip:bob@example.com and sip:2001@10.1.1.1.
During the tear down of a SIP-based VoIP call, the BYE request messages are used to
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terminate a SIP connection session. The BYE message also contains SIP URIs, which
can identify certain users or domain addresses. For the purpose of this research, the
INVITE and BYE SIP requests are examined in the SIP transaction because they
contain the URI of both the sender and receiver.
2.1.3 The Domain Name System. The Domain Name System (DNS) is
perhaps the most critical service for the Internet. DNS converts human-friendly host
addresses to computer readable Internet host addresses, much like a phone book. This
allows a user to remember google.com instead of the IP address 74.125.67.100. De-
spite the massive dependency on DNS, the security and vulnerabilities of the protocol
have recently come to light. A brief overview of how DNS works is followed by the
current methods of abusing the protocol, specifically DNS tunneling.
2.1.3.1 The Domain Name System Overview. DNS is a distributed
database that is indexed by domain names with the goal of decentralized adminis-
tration. The domain name is part of a path in an inverted tree that constitutes the
domain name space. As shown in Figure 2.2, the top of the inverted tree contains the
root, with various subdomains that branch off from it [AL01].
Figure 2.2: The Domain Name System Distributed Database [Moh09].
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Each of the nodes, or domain names, contain a text label that is capped at 63
characters in length as opposed to the root which is a zero-length, or null, label. The
full domain name of a node starts from the node and follows the path up towards root,
adding each subsequent node to its name [AL01]. In the example from Figure 2.2,
this would be www.cs.colorado.edu.
2.1.3.2 Domain Name System and the Internet. DNS is implemented
on the Internet to create one of the most crucial infrastructure services. The Internet
domain name space consists of certain top level domains. Some of these top level
domains include .com, .edu, .mil, and .gov and are managed by the Internet Corpo-
ration for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). With the knowledge of the top
level domains, it is easier to dissect and read domain names. The decentralized ad-
ministration of DNS is possible through delegation. Delegation allows domains and
subdomains to be broken up for ease of management [AL01]. The personnel who
run the .mil domain would rather delegate responsibility to the subdomains, such as
af.mil and navy.mil, than manage each of them.
A key component of a domain name space is the name server. Name servers
contain information pertaining to the domain name space, also called a zone. There
are two types of name servers: secondary master and primary master. The secondary
master for a zone name server polls the primary master server for zone data. The
primary master name server for a zone extracts the data for the zone from a local file,
called zone data files, which are also referred to as data files or database files. The zone
data files contain resource records describing the hosts and delegation subdomains in
the zone. These zone data files also contain entries called DNS resource records [AL01].
Each of the domains in a domain name space contains resource records that
contain data associated with the domain. Some of these records include A for address
record, NS for nameserver record, CNAME for canonical name record, and TXT for
text record [AL01].
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Another key component of the domain name space is the resolver, which is
a client that accesses name servers when information is needed. An example is a
web browser trying to determine the IP address of google.com. The resolver’s three
tasks are to handle querying a name server, interpreting responses, and passing the
information to the requesting program [AL01].
The resolution process is important for name servers to retrieve data from the
domain name space for the resolvers. Name servers perform two functions in the
domain name space. The first is to resolve data within their own authoritative zones
(within their own organization’s network). The second function is resolve data for non-
authoritative zones in the domain name space (from another organization’s network).
The resolution of data by name servers is accomplished either recursively or iteratively.
In the recursive case, name servers pass the responsibility to more authoritative name
servers to resolve data. The iterative process requires a single name server to query
other name servers to try and get closer to the actual answer [AL01].
2.1.3.3 Abusing the Internet Domain Name System. The reliability,
speed, and dependence on DNS make it a critical service for the Internet. However,
the DNS protocol can be taken advantage of for nefarious purposes. One method of
abusing the protocol is DNS tunneling as first suggested in a 1998 Bugtraq posting by
Oskar Pearson [Pea98]. DNS tunneling is an abuse of DNS records to transfer non-
DNS data in and out of a network using the DNS protocol. Non-DNS data can include
files, botnet commands, and even segmented audio media [Van09]. DNS tunneling is
appealing because it is a covert channel and is operating system independent [Van09].
DNS tunneling contrasts with legitimate tunnels, such as Virtual Private Network
and Secure Shell, which are explained in Section 2.3.
The concept of the DNS tunnel is to use a DNS server, under control of a hacker,
as an external trusted server to tunnel information out of a protected network through
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) port 53. Since most protected networks permit DNS
traffic to exit, the requests are granted. The data are transmitted through the tunnel
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by sending data to the hacker’s DNS server in the form of a query and getting data
back in the form of a response [Van09]. This can be done once to communicate with
a botnet or repeated thousands of times to exfiltrate files and data. The tunneled
data appears as the DNS request, [exfiltrated data].hacker.com, with the data
residing in the lowest level domain. The [exfiltrated data] is usually encoded in
Base32 or Base64 and would look more like 0adbEnPJygrGCgvGS.hacker.com if it
was viewed using a network protocol analyzer such as Wireshark. Since hacker.com
is under the hacker’s control, the DNS server interprets the request according to
the hacker’s desires. The hacker’s DNS server decodes the exfiltrated data and then
responds with data that is tunneled back to the compromised computer in the form
of a DNS response [Van09]. Figure 2.3 summarizes the process in five steps:
Figure 2.3: Establishing a Domain Name System Tunnel.
1. The victim’s computer performs a DNS request for
[exfiltrated data].hacker.com.
2. [exfiltrated data].hacker.com is not locally cached, so the victim asks the
Company X root DNS server if it can resolve the request.
3. Company X’s root DNS server cannot resolve the request, so it forwards it to
the DNS server under the hacker’s control at hacker.com.
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4. The hacker sends back a DNS response which easily passes through a network
defense appliance since DNS is assumed to be trusted.
5. The victim receives the DNS response to exfiltrate more data, connect to a
botnet, etc.
The amount and type of data transferred through a DNS tunnel depends on the
DNS record being used. Some of the commonly abused DNS records to tunnel data
include:
• TXT: Text records permit free form data and can include spaces. Information
stored is encoded in Base64 allowing 220 bytes of data per record. TXT records
can contain any data in them as long as the length is less than 255 octets.
• CNAME: Canonical Name Records are alias records. They only allow the char-
acters A through Z, digits 0-9, and the hyphen.
• EDNS0: The Extension Mechanism for DNS record can be greater than the 512
byte UDP DNS maximum and carry a 1280 byte default payload.
• A and MX: Address and Mail records, respectively. They can be used as well,
but have more limitations and cannot store all types of data [Van09].
2.1.3.4 The OzymanDNS Domain Name System Tunneling Application.
OzymanDNS is a tunneling program used to tunnel all Internet traffic through DNS.
It accomplishes this by encapsulating Internet data as DNS traffic and sending it
through UDP port 53 instead of the traditional HTTP TCP port 80. It was developed
by the DNS security guru Dan Kaminsky. This program allows users to discreetly
send traffic through port 53 and the DNS protocol. Organizations and agencies rely
on DNS to provide domain name resolution and lookups for the network and users.
The ability for malicious users to transport possible data and traffic through a trusted
and overall innocuous port is a major threat. The OzymanDNS suite of perl scripts
is 32 kilobytes, making it a small and efficient exfiltration tool [Kam09].
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2.1.3.5 The Iodine Domain Name System Tunneling Application.
Iodine is another program capable of tunneling Internet Protocol version 4 traffic
through DNS. Iodine offers more benefits over other DNS tunnel implementations.
Some of these benefits include portability between systems, a Message-Digest algo-
rithm 5 (MD5) challenge-response for login, and the use of the NULL type to allow
unencoded downstream data which allows up to a kilobyte of compressed payload
data. The single program can operate as a client or server depending on the options
specified by a user. Iodine supports, in decreasing bandwidth order, the use of NULL,
TXT, SRV, MX, CNAME and A records [Kry09]. For this research, the malicious
DNS packets used for testing are created using Iodine.
2.2 Analyzing and Classifying Network Traffic
Before the advent of Darknets and anonymizers like Tor (see Section 2.3), ana-
lyzing network traffic was relatively simple [BEPW02] [Tor09a]. The three methods
for analyzing network traffic are port matching, payload analysis, and transport-level
communication flow.
2.2.1 Port Matching Analysis. The most rudimentary, although sometimes
most effective, method of classifying network traffic is done by port matching analysis.
The transport level source and destination ports are extracted to reveal which ports
are being used. By comparing the ports to a known list of protocols, the traffic can
be classified quickly and efficiently.
Simple examples include the use of port 23 for telnet or port 80 for web servers.
Ports 23 and 80 are well known ports for their respective services, although they are
not bound to the ports. A protocol of interest in this research, DNS, runs over both
TCP and UDP port 53. Identifying traffic on UDP port 53 will be critical in detecting
DNS exfiltration attempts.
The primary problem with port matching is that some applications are not
anchored to a port or port range. For example, the BitTorrent protocol is not anchored
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to a single port. BitTorrent users have the option to manually assign a port number
to use or allow the client program to randomly assign one. Malicious insiders could
potentially run BitTorrent through port 80, a port open on most enterprise networks
for web traffic [Gon05]. Only a detailed packet inspection would reveal the true
nature of the traffic. Research shows up to 70% of Internet traffic is unidentifiable
strictly based on port, underlining the futility in identifying traffic solely based on
port matching [MW06].
2.2.2 Payload Analysis. The next step in classifying network traffic can
be done by analyzing the payload. The payload of packets contains certain byte
strings signifying the use of a certain application or protocol. Sen et al. developed an
approach to identify peer-to-peer protocols based on application-level signatures. The
protocols researched were Gnutella, eDonkey, DirectConnect, Kazaa, and BitTorrent.
With the BitTorrent protocol, there is no signaling traffic between the client server
and tracker server. Sen, et al. identified BitTorrent traffic by the distinct BitTorrent
handshake message [SSW04]. The BitTorrent handshake message has the following
format:
<0x13><BitTorrent Protocol>
The BitTorrent 20-byte signature is at a fixed location in the payload making its
identification accurate [SSW04]. This makes payload analysis an attractive method
for detecting BitTorrent traffic because of the unique signature. Additionally, Sen,
et al. found a virtual 0% false positive and 10% false negative detection rate for
identifying the peer-to-peer traffic [SSW04].
Payload analysis is effective in identifying BitTorrent payloads that have not
been obfuscated. The simple technique of byte padding can render these payload-
based analyzers useless, unless they are modified to search through the entire payload
for the specific string. Network traffic and payload obfuscation methods are discussed
in Section 2.3.
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2.2.3 Behavioral Analysis. The last method of classifying network traffic
is to examine it at the transport layer. Karagiannis, et al. developed a systematic
method of identifying peer-to-peer traffic flows at the transport layer while relegating
the accuracy of the previously discussed port matching and payload analysis meth-
ods [KBFC04]. Their methodology focuses on two metrics when analyzing packet
headers to detect peer-to-peer traffic flows. The first metric is to observe source-
destination IP pairs that are using both TCP and UDP transfers, a common mark of
peer-to-peer protocols. However, other applications also use TCP/UDP pairs, such as
DNS, Network Basic Input/Output System (NetBIOS), Internet Relay Chat (IRC),
and gaming applications, so those application layer protocols are ignored [KBFC04].
The second metric is observing connection characteristics of {IP, port} pairs.
When a host joins a peer-to-peer network, it consults its starting host cache for the
IP address of other peers or servers. After a connection is established between the
host and another peer, the host advertises its IP address and port number to receive
connections. It is essentially the host’s identification in the peer-to-peer network.
When twenty different peers decide to connect to the host, the traffic will reveal
twenty distinct IP addresses with twenty distinct source ports all connected to the
host. The equality of distinct IP addresses and ports (e.g., 20 distinct IP addresses
with 20 unique ports) signifies a probable peer-to-peer connection [KBFC04].
Behavioral Analysis is effective in quickly identifying traffic based on the 5-
tuple {source IP, source port, destination IP, destination port, transport layer pro-
tocol} across a network backbone. It can also be used to identify new peer-to-peer
applications or protocols that have been modified. There are several drawbacks with
this heuristic for detecting peer-to-peer traffic. First, the method cannot detect the
specific peer-to-peer protocol or the payload being transferred. Furthermore, the Bit-
Torrent protocol is not one of the six peer-to-peer protocols analyzed that relies on
TCP/UDP pairs. Secondly, the 95% peer-to-peer flow detection rate, coupled with
the 8% to 12% false positive rate, makes it an effective, but not guaranteed, method
of detecting peer-to-peer traffic [KBFC04].
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2.3 Network Traffic and Data Obfuscation Methods
In certain cases it is important to encrypt data and traffic for security reasons,
such as online credit card transactions or when sending confidential emails. It is
also important in some cases for journalists, whistleblowers, and citizens of repressed
regimes to retain anonymity. However, the same methods of encrypting, obfuscating,
and anonymizing data can be used for illicit purposes. These methods include byte
padding, Ron’s Code 4 (RC4) encryption, Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnels,
and Secure Shell (SSH) tunnels, darknets, and the Tor network.
2.3.1 Byte Padding. Byte padding is the most primitive obfuscation method
used to hide payloads in network traffic. When byte padding is used, a series of
random characters is prepended to the payload to trick elementary packet analyzers
(see Section 2.2.2). The packet analyzer will identify the payload as encrypted or
unknown since it does not match any known payload signatures.
Although byte padding is a cheap and easy method of obfuscating data, it suffers
two major weaknesses. The first is that the payload is still readable within the packet,
it is simply in a different location. Smart analyzers can sequentially search for the
byte string in the payload, but this takes more time. The second problem is that
only the payload is obfuscated and not the entire conversation. This allows network
flow-based algorithms to identify the network protocol being used.
2.3.2 Ron’s Code 4. The Ron’s Code 4 (RC4) algorithm was invented by
Ronald Rivest from RSA Security in 1987 [Riv09] [Sta06]. RC4 is a variable key-size
stream cipher that relies on single byte operations [RSA09]. The cipher performs
quickly in software and has been implemented in Secure Socket Layer protocol com-
munication, Lotus Notes, Oracle Secure SQL, and in the Wired Equivalent Privacy
security for IEEE 802.11 [Tec09]. Another use of the RC4 cipher is in payload ob-
fuscation of BitTorrent packets. The cipher can perform faster than other symmetric
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stream ciphers as seen in Table 2.1. The table categorizes different ciphers, the key
length, and the speed of the encryption cipher in Mbps.
Table 2.1: Speed Comparisons of Symmetric Ciphers on a Pentium II [Sta06].
Cipher Key Length Speed (Mbps)
DES 56 9
3DES 168 3
RC2 variable 0.9
RC4 variable 45
2.3.3 Virtual Private Network and Secure Shell Tunnels. One method of
obfuscating network data and the traffic is to use a tunnel. Tunnels allow one protocol
to be transferred over another protocol. Common tunneling applications include VPN
and SSH. Gebski et al. assert the difficulty in identifying the underlying protocols
because the entire packet is scrambled and encrypted, as are any useful fields in the
TCP/IP header [GPW06].
In the VPN and SSH obfuscation methods, an encrypted tunnel is established
between the downloader and uploader. Network data and traffic are transmitted only
after the tunnel has been established. The network data and traffic are encapsulated
with an SSH or VPN header, thus encrypting the entire network conversation instead
of just the payload. Analyzers of the network traffic will only be able to identify the
source and destination IP addresses, approximate packet size, and timing of the traf-
fic [GPW06]. Despite the limited information leaked by VPN and SSH connections,
Gebski et al. correctly identified encapsulated BitTorrent traffic 90.5% of the time
using bipartite graphs of outgoing-incoming node pairs [GPW06]. This discovery was
supported when Wright et al. were able to accurately track the flows of encrypted
tunnels carrying a single application protocol [WMM06]. It should be noted that both
of these methods of inferring the underlying traffic are still unable to conclude what
the packets contain.
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2.3.4 Darknets. An even more clandestine form of file sharing and commu-
nication is rising in the form of Darknets. Biddle et al. of Microsoft first addressed the
rise of content distribution and peer-to-peer networks in their 2002 paper entitled “The
Darknet and the Future of Content Distribution.” They concluded that Darknet-
based peer-to-peer file sharing technologies were growing in convenience, bandwidth,
and efficiency and would not likely encounter technical impediments [BEPW02].
The definition of a Darknet has evolved from any public peer-to-peer network,
such as BitTorrent, Usenet, and Gnutella, to any network that is friend-to-friend ori-
ented. These Darknets, as opposed to the public Lightnets, are based on a “members
only” camaraderie and trust between members. Darknets are, in the truest sense,
nearly impossible to find. However, there is software available to the public to es-
tablish Darknets [Fil07]. Two of the most popular Darknet software applications are
Freenet and WASTE. The availability of public software to join and establish private
Darknets makes it difficult to detect illicit file transfers and possible private VoIP
connections.
2.3.4.1 Freenet. Freenet is a software application allowing users to
publish and retrieve information without the fear of being censored [Fre09]. Freenet
can be described as an “Internet within an Internet” that relies on encrypted commu-
nication between other nodes. Users contribute to the Freenet project by providing
bandwidth for routing and a piece of their hard drive, called the data store, to hold
encrypted data. The user is oblivious to the content being stored in the data store,
thus making it difficult for prosecution of possession of illegal or copyrighted mate-
rial. The data is automatically added and deleted based on the popularity of certain
content and the needs of Freenet [Fre09].
2.3.4.2 WASTE. WASTE is a software application and protocol that
caters to smaller groups of 10-50 nodes. It provides an anonymous, secure, and
encrypted collaboration tool to share ideas and data [WAS09]. WASTE implements
a decentralized distributed architecture for nodes to create a partial mesh network.
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Security features include link-level encryption using Blowfish and RSA public keys for
authentication. This application allows trusted users to securely trade possibly illicit
or illegal files with each other [WAS09].
2.3.5 The Onion Router Network. The last method of obfuscating and
hiding network traffic data is The Onion Router (Tor) network. Tor is the most
popular and “good intentioned” anonymizer allowing users to maintain privacy and
security on the public Internet through numerous layers. The benefits of Tor include
security and privacy by using a distributed network of relays to bounce traffic. It is
supposed to prevent monitoring and the revealing of your physical location [Tor09a].
These indirect and random data pathways make it difficult for sophisticated traffic
analysis to take place.
Tor could technically be considered a Darknet, but the intentions and goals
of the project seem to separate it from the negative connotations associated with
Darknets. Some government entities use Tor as well. The United States Navy uses Tor
for open source intelligence gathering and law enforcement uses Tor to anonymously
survey web sites [Tor09b]. The technical aspects of Tor are similar to Freenet and
WASTE, in which users can voluntarily route traffic throughout the network.
Tor differs from VPNs and other encrypted tunnels in that it is not susceptible
to timing and communication analysis. Despite the best intentions of the Tor network,
illicit file sharers can still use it to transfer illegal material.
2.4 Current Methods for Detecting Illicit Traffic
There are many methods currently available to detect illicit traffic. This sections
covers the simpler, software-based solutions such as using Snort rules and progresses
towards the more intelligent solutions that utilize artificial intelligence.
2.4.1 Wireshark. Wireshark is one of the most popular network protocol
analyzers. It is the standard for analyzing traffic and simple network troubleshooting.
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It runs as a software application on a system and requires a network card that can
be set to promiscuous mode. Wireshark will display all of the incoming and outgoing
packets on an interface, but allows the user to filter the results by protocol, IP address,
or port number, to name a few. The advantages of Wireshark are that it is free,
reliable, and easy to use on a small scale. The disadvantages of Wireshark include
operating at the application layer and the inability to perform complex traffic analysis
[Wir09].
2.4.2 Snort. Snort is an open source intrusion detection and prevention
system designed to be implemented in software. It is a rule-based application that
can perform real-time traffic analysis and packet logging on IP networks. Snort is
capable of protocol analysis, content searching and matching, and attack detection
by relying on a flexible rule set used to describe the handling of certain traffic. Snort
has three modes of operation: packet sniffer, packet logger, or a complete Intrusion
Prevention System [Sno10]. Snort is a powerful and highly-regarded Intrusion Pre-
vention System for providing network security. However, Snort has two shortfalls.
First, Snort must be installed and run on a dedicated and powerful computer because
of the processor-intensive rules. Large rule sets can deteriorate the performance of
Snort if it is processing all inbound and outbound traffic. This scenario could lead to
possible missed critical BitTorrent, SIP, or DNS packets. Secondly, since Snort and
the Snort rules are open source, the code can be analyzed to determine how to avoid
detection [Sno10].
2.4.3 Hi-Performance Protocol Identification Engine. The Hi-Performance
Protocol Identification Engine (HiPPIE) is another software-based protocol analyzer.
It differs from Wireshark in that it attempts to analyze traffic and protocols heuris-
tically. Some of the more impressive features include Session Prediction Support and
Tunneled Protocol Tracking. The Session Prediction Support has the ability to pre-
dict upcoming protocol sessions. The Tunneled Protocol Tracking feature identifies
the internal protocol being used with a tunneling protocol [HiP09b].
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The HiPPIE advertises three main functionalities [HiP09a]. The main function-
alities include:
1. Passive traffic analyzer: HiPPIE must be installed in the kernel of a Linux
system and configured to push traffic to a single-sourced bridge interface.
2. Inline Protocol/Packet Filter: This method entails establishing a Linux system
with HiPPIE as either an in-line bridge or routing device that forces traffic
through using integrated Netfilter or IPTables to filter traffic. It also allows
network administrators to tag or limit certain types of traffic based on HiPPIE’s
recognition capabilities.
3. Plug-in to a third party system: This option, although not completed, allows
administrators to pass traffic from a traffic sniffing application, such as tcpdump,
to be analyzed by HiPPIE.
The downside of the HiPPIE system is that it does not perform payload inspec-
tion, only protocol analysis [HiP09b]. Payload inspection consists of examining the
contents of a packet. Protocol Analysis only inspects the headers to determine what
protocol is being transmitted.
2.4.4 BitTorrent Monitoring System. Another method of detecting and
tracking illicit files is the BitTorrent Monitoring (BTM) system, created by Chow,
et al. The BTM is an automatic, rule-based software application to monitor, record,
and analyze BitTorrent traffic [CCM+07]. Figure 2.4 illustrates how the BTM system
works. The BTM is divided into two different modules, the Torrent Searcher and
Torrent Analyzer.
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Figure 2.4: The BitTorrent Monitoring System Process [CCM+07].
The Torrent Searcher is a passive reconnaissance function to collect torrents of
interest. The BTM commences by searching public forums and web sites for torrent
files and exploring the various hyperlinks. This depth-first search continues until a
predefined level has been reached. Each torrent file and webpage containing prede-
fined keywords of interest are downloaded and archived to the local investigator’s
computer [CCM+07].
The Torrent Analyzer is the interactive portion of the BTM since it commu-
nicates with trackers to retrieve the list of peers sharing the file. Responses from
the trackers and peers are recorded by the BTM for future analysis. The BTM
has a real-time attributed-based rule engine to flag specific tracker or peer informa-
tion [CCM+07].
The fundamentals of the BTM system are sound, but there are several con-
cerns to consider. First, the scope of the system is limited due to the immense vol-
ume of torrent files on the Internet. Two of the larger tracker sites, piratebay.org
and isohunt.com, contain approximately 1.8 million and 1.7 million torrents, respec-
tively [Bay09] [ISO09]. Secondly, the fluctuating list of peers associated with a torrent
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changes by the minute, making the BTM system less than ideal for associating specific
IPs with a file [CCM+07].
2.4.5 Entropy-Based Malicious DNS detection. As mentioned earlier, the
DNS protocol can be abused to exfiltrate data or be used as a command and con-
trol channel for botnets. Typically, DNS traffic is minimal between clients (DNS
resolvers) and servers (DNS servers). Romana et al. performed an entropy study of
external DNS query traffic to the university network’s top domain server. Any peak
in the entropy was assumed to be associated with spam botnet activity [RKSM08].
Figure 2.5 illustrates the entropy changes in source IP addresses and the DNS query
contents-based parameters.
Figure 2.5: Entropy Changes In the Domain Name System External Query Traf-
fic [RKSM08].
The drastic changes in entropy, denoted as the spikes, were hypothesized to
be botnets used to communicate, exfiltrate data, or perform other malicious mis-
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sions. Botnet infection was verified on the computers after performing forensic anal-
ysis [RKSM08].
2.4.6 Cross Entropy-Based Malicious DNS detection. Karasaridis et al. de-
veloped a DNS Tunneling Attack Detector (TUNAD) to detect suspicious DNS packet
size anomalies in real-time [KMHH06]. Outlying packet sizes are usually indicative
of malicious tunneling over DNS. Their approach is as follows:
1. Separate DNS packets into three types and calculate the frequency
of non-conforming UDP DNS packet sizes:
• Requests: source port, sport>1023 and destination port, dport=53.
The size cannot exceed 300 bytes.
• Response: source port, sport=53 and destination port, dport>1023.
These are normally less than 512 bytes.
• Unknown: Response or request certainty is unknown, with sport=53
and dport=53. These are normally less than 512 bytes.
2. Measure the exact packet size using single packet flow records.
3. Calculate hourly packet size histograms for each circuit and packet
type.
4. Use a Cross Entropy-based anomaly detector on the packet size his-
tograms.
The algorithm then computes the Cross Entropy, Self Entropy, and Relative
Entropy to detect anomalies. The algorithm was successful in detecting a change in
Relative Entropy of packet sizes on September 30, 2003 before reports surfaced about
the Sinit Trojan that used port 53. This method of calculating changes from a relative
baseline is important in detecting suspicious DNS traffic [KMHH06].
2.4.7 Detecting DNS Tunnels Using Artificial Neural Networks. In 2009,
jhind presented research on detecting DNS tunnels using artificial intelligence called
dnsTTrap [jhi10]. The algorithm relies on Artificial Neural Networks. The algorithm,
also called supervised learning, works as follows:
1. Receive inputs (number of packets to domain, average length of packets to
domain, average number of distinct characters in the lowest level domain)
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2. Give them values (assign weights)
3. Adapt decisions until inputs match training data (set thresholds)
The goal was to examine the entropy of the data contained in the lowest level
domain. The reasoning is that if data is being exfiltrated by the lowest level domain,
the content of each lowest level domain will be entropic. Each lowest level domain
is assigned a numerical value, allowing comparison between other lowest level do-
mains. For example, the domains mail.example.com and mail2.example.com will
have minimal entropy between them. However, the domains, 4ryf76df.hacker.com
and 73bfdd7r.hacker.com will have greater entropy and can be classified as a possi-
ble DNS tunnel. The last step is to train the neural net using data controlled by the
user. False negatives are added to the training list and the system is retrained [jhi10].
The system managed to detect DNS tunnels created by the DNS tunneling ap-
plications Iodine, OzymanDNS, and tcp2dns. However, the system lacks real-time
detection since it only works against previously captured tcpdump files. In addition,
the system only analyzes the lowest level domain, instead of the entire domain. DNS
tunneling applications can be modified to transfer data at different levels of the do-
main, such as exfiltrated_data.mail.example.com
to mail.exfiltrated_data.example.com [jhi10].
2.5 The Substitute Database Manager Hashing Function
A new feature of the TRAPP-2 system is the implementation of a hashing func-
tion used in the Substitute Database Manager (sdbm) library. The hashing function
converts arbitrary-length strings into eight-byte hashes. The arbitrary-length strings
in this case are SIP URIs and DNS domains. The sdbm hashing function is selected
over more proven hashing functions such as SHA-1 and MD5 because it is quick and
easy to implement. Further justification of the feature can be found in Section 3.2.2.
In December 1990, Ozan Yigit released the sdbm library into the public do-
main as an alternative to the original Database Manager (dbm) database engine, and
27
subsequent New Database Manager (ndbm) database engine, developed by AT&T in
1979 [Yig10b] [SY91]. The sdbm library is a clone of the ndbm library and parallels
the functionality. However, the sdbm library relies on the simple hashing algorithm
found below, implemented in the C programming language [Yig10a].
static unsigned long sdbm(unsigned char *str){
unsigned long hash = 0;
int c;
while (c = *str++)
hash = c + (hash << 6) + (hash << 16) - hash;
return hash;
}
According to the creator, Ozan Yigit, sdbm “was found to do well in scrambling
bits, causing better distribution of the keys and fewer splits. It also happens to be a
good general hashing function with good distribution” [Yig10a]. The hashing func-
tion’s speed (See Appendix B), eight-byte hashes, and easy software implementation
made it an ideal hashing function for the TRAPP-2 system. While using the hashing
function, one drawback occasionally noted is the minimal avalanche effect in which
changing a DNS domain by one bit (e.g., from 123.com to 124.com) changes the hash
by one bit. Another possible drawback is the number of collisions between hashes.
This, however, is not investigated since the assumption is that an administrator will
review the packets and their hashed domains.
2.6 The Tracking and Analysis for Peer-to-Peer System
A FPGA-based packet analyzer was developed in 2008 to detect peer-to-peer
protocols traversing a network. The TRAPP system was built specifically to detect
BitTorrent and VoIP traffic. The TRAPP system was created as an alternative to
current illegal file detection techniques such as software packet sniffers and the Bit-
Torrent Monitoring System. A discussion of these various techniques can be found
in Section 2.4. The current TRAPP system is built on a Xilinx Virtex-II Pro FPGA
board. The TRAPP system, capabilities, and limitations are expanded to better
understand the state of the system [Sch09].
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2.6.1 Capabilities. The TRAPP system is designed to operate at the gate-
way between the Internet and a government local area network (LAN). It is not placed
in-line with traffic entering or exiting the local network, so if the TRAPP system fails,
the network will still remain viable. Instead, it is placed on the Switched Port Ana-
lyzer (SPAN) port of a switch. The switch is configured to send packets to the correct
destination in addition to the SPAN port. This makes the TRAPP system virtually
invisible and undetectable to both normal and malicious users. The TRAPP system
extracts the BitTorrent file hash or SIP URI and compares it against a list of known
contraband file hashes or SIP identifiers. The detection of the contraband files and
SIP identifiers is done in real-time. Figure 2.6 is a flowchart overview of how the sys-
tem works [Sch09]. The TRAPP system analyzes every packet flowing through the
network switch, looking for a BitTorrent or SIP signature. If the packet has a Bit-
Torrent or SIP signature, the hash or SIP URI are extracted, respectively. A binary
search is performed on the extracted hash against a blacklist of BitTorrent hashes or
SIP URIs. If a match is found, the packet is logged, else it is dropped [Sch09].
2.6.2 Limitations. There are several limitations with the TRAPP system.
These limitations include the hardware, contraband file list size, SIP URI extraction,
and lack of malicious DNS traffic detection [Sch09].
The first limitation of the TRAPP system is the hardware. The hardware com-
ponents of interest on the Xilinx Virtex-II Pro FPGA board are the 100 megabit
Ethernet card and 300 MHz processor [Xil08], which are suitable for smaller LANs
with less traffic to compare against the contraband list. In reality, the size of govern-
ment networks, traffic, and bandwidth requirements justify faster hardware.
Another drawback of the TRAPP system is the size of the contraband list. The
TRAPP system relies on 64 KB of memory to store the blacklist of BitTorrent file
hashes and SIP identifiers. The size of the list is limited to 1000 entries [Sch09]. This
size is appropriate for a first iteration proof-of-concept system, but in reality, the list
size needs to be much larger.
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Figure 2.6: TRacking and Analysis for Peer-to-Peer System Flowchart [Sch09].
The third limitation is how TRAPP deals with processing SIP packets. The
TRAPP system only extracts the first 12 bytes of a SIP URI. For example, if the SIP
URI is 2001@10.1.1.50, the TRAPP system extracts 2001@10.1.1. and compares it
against the list of interest [Sch09]. Although feasible, this logic is not realistic. This
limitation is elaborated on in Section 3.2.2.
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Lastly, the TRAPP system is unable to detect illicit DNS traffic. Hackers and
malicious users abuse the DNS protocol to transfer data and information, in addition
to communicating with botnets [Sch09].
2.7 Summary
This chapter discusses the illicit traffic and protocols of interest for this research,
specifically BitTorrent, VoIP, and DNS. The traditional methods of classifying net-
work traffic such as port matching are examined. This is followed by exploring the
current methods of obfuscating and encrypting network data and traffic. The current
methods of identifying and detecting these types of traffic, both clear and encrypted,
are also summarized. The details of the sdbm hashing function are also expanded.
Finally, a review of the TRAPP system’s capabilities and limitations are detailed.
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III. Methodology
This chapter explains the methods used to evaluate the performance of theTRAPP-2 system. The two metrics measured are packet processing time and
the probability of packet intercept. The first section details the Goals and Hypotheses.
Section 3.2 outlines the Approach, and Section 3.3 outlines the System Boundaries.
The System Workloads are defined in Section 3.5, followed by Performance Metrics
in Section 3.6, System Parameters in Section 3.7, and Factors in Section 3.8. The
last three sections include the Evaluation Technique in Section 3.9, the Experimental
Design in Section 3.10, and the Summary in Section 3.11.
3.1 Goals and Hypotheses
The objective of this research is to test and evaluate the performance of the
TRAPP-2 system that detects packets of interest traversing a gigabit Ethernet net-
work. The packets of interest include BitTorrent handshake packets with file hashes
of interest, SIP Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI) of interest, and suspicious DNS
traffic. The TRAPP-2 system detects these transmissions, classifies the traffic, ex-
tracts the payload (and sdbm hashes it for SIP/DNS domains), compares the hash
against a list, and records the transmission information.
The goals of this research are to:
1. Determine the packet processing times for packets of interest.
2. Determine the probability of packet intercept under a flood of packets of interest.
3. Determine the probability of packet intercept under various network utilizations.
4. Determine how increasing the hash list size affects the packet processing time.
32
The hypotheses of this research are:
1. The TRAPP-2 system can process every type of packet under 35,000 CPU
cycles.
2. The TRAPP-2 system can detect over 50% of packets of interest flooded into
the system.
3. The TRAPP-2 system can detect and process BitTorrent and DNS packets with
at least a 90% probability of packet intercept under a 90% network utilization.
Furthermore, it is hypothesized that the TRAPP-2 system can detect and pro-
cess SIP INVITE and SIP BYE packets with at least a 19% probability of packet
intercept under a 90% network utilization.
4. The TRAPP-2 system’s mean packet processing time will increase by no more
than 50 CPU cycles each time the hash list size is doubled.
Four experiments are conducted to determine if the TRAPP-2 system meets
the goals and hypotheses. Figure 3.1 summarizes the experiments, metrics, and goals
used to evaluate the performance of the TRAPP-2 system.
Figure 3.1: Summary of Experiments for the TRacking and Analysis for Peer-to-
Peer 2 System.
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3.2 Approach
The TRAPP-2 system is developed on the Xilinx ML510 FPGA. The reason for
developing the TRAPP-2 system on an FPGA board is similar to the original TRAPP
system, henceforth referred to as “TRAPP-1” in this research. The system’s simplicity
and speed is maximized by allowing the software application to directly access the
Ethernet controller buffers [Sch09]. In addition, hardware components can easily be
added with minimum overhead. Some elements and functions from the TRAPP-1
system are used for the TRAPP-2 system, but a majority of the code is rewritten
to function with the updated FPGA hardware and research goals. Although both
systems work similarly, major hardware and software changes are required to achieve
proper functionality in the TRAPP-2 system. A review of the TRAPP-1 system can
be found in Section 2.6.
3.2.1 Hardware Modifications. The major hardware modification between
the TRAPP-1 and TRAPP-2 systems is the Ethernet controller. The TRAPP-1
system relies on the EthernetLite core peripheral, which has an upper limit of 100
Mbps. For the TRAPP-2 system, a Trimode Ethernet Media Access Controller is
used to receive Ethernet frames at 1000 Mbps. An accompanying First-In-First-Out
32,768-byte buffer stores Ethernet frames until they can be processed. As a result,
the TRAPP-2 system is not strictly linked to a clock like the TRAPP-1 system.
The second hardware modification is the memory location of the hash list and
log file. The hash list, separate for each of the three protocols, contains a sorted list
of hashes used to determine if a BitTorrent, SIP, or DNS packet hash is of interest.
The log file contains all of the packets of interest detected by the TRAPP-2 system.
The TRAPP-1 system relies on two sets of 64 KB Block Random Access Memory
(BRAM) to separately store the hash list and log file. The maximum amount of
BRAM available on the TRAPP-2 system’s FPGA is 128 KB per block. This severely
limits the maximum hash list size, which is explored in Experiment 4. As a result,
the BRAM architecture is abandoned in favor of a 512 MB Synchronous Dynamic
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Random Access Memory (SDRAM) scheme for the TRAPP-2 system. SDRAM is
used to store the hash list and log file together. Pilot tests reveal an average increase
of 777 CPU cycles in packet processing time for the SDRAM scheme. However, the
4096-fold gain in physical memory address space at the cost of 777 CPU cycles is
acceptable. This memory configuration is also more realistic for future configurations
that will rely on larger hash lists. The pilot test data for memory access times can
be found in Appendix B. Hardware construction details for TRAPP-2 can be found
in Appendix C.
3.2.2 Software Modifications. The first software modification adds code to
detect the DNS protocol. Pilot tests reveal that the DNS detection logic requires an
average of 23 CPU cycles. The DNS detection logic results in 1.37% (23/1672) of the
total packet processing time for the packet with the smallest packet processing time
(DNS-OFF-SMALL, which is explained in Section 3.5). The pilot test data for the
DNS packet detection logic can be found in Appendix B.
The second software modification involves the processing of SIP and DNS pack-
ets. The TRAPP-1 system only extracts the first 12 bytes of a SIP URI. For example,
if the SIP URI is 2001@10.1.1.50, the TRAPP-1 system extracts 2001@10.1.1. and
compares it against the list of interest. Although feasible, this logic is not realistic
because SIP usernames, 2001 in this case, can easily be changed. The TRAPP-2 sys-
tem does not extract the SIP username, 2001, in the example. The second problem
is in how the TRAPP-1 system addresses SIP URI domains, or everything after the @
symbol. The TRAPP-1 system algorithm assumes the domain is only seven charac-
ters long. As an improvement, the TRAPP-2 system extracts the entire domain and
is not limited by the domain length.
The final software modification involves hashing SIP and DNS domains. For the
hash lists of interest, a uniform hash length is required for proper binary searching
of the hash list. The variable-length domains of both SIP and DNS do not allow
for a uniform hash list. As a result, the sdbm hash is implemented to convert the
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variable length SIP and DNS domains into a four-byte hash. More details about the
sdbm hash can be found in Section 2.5. Pilot tests reveal that an average of 86 CPU
cycles are required to sdbm hash a six character domain and 1,195 CPU cycles are
required to sdbm hash a 212 character domain name. This 86 - 1,195 CPU cycle
increase in packet processing time is acceptable to create uniform hash identifiers for
the variable-length SIP and DNS domains. The pilot test data for the sdbm hashing
times can be found in Appendix B.
3.2.3 Algorithm. Figure 3.2 illustrates the TRAPP-2 algorithm which in-
cludes the following steps:
1. Detect packet
2. Determine if BitTorrent, SIP, or DNS packet
3. If BitTorrent/SIP/DNS packet, extract the payload; else, discard the packet
4. If SIP or DNS, sdbm hash the domains
5. Compare the hash against the hash list
6. If a match is found (BitTorrent or SIP), log the packet; else, drop the packet
7. If a match is not found (DNS), log the packet; else, drop the packet
For BitTorrent packets, the system detects a BitTorrent handshake packet, ex-
tracts the first four bytes of the 20-byte SHA-1 hash, compares the hash against a
blacklist containing the first four bytes of suspicious hashes, and logs it if the hash is
on the blacklist. A BitTorrent packet is defined as a TCP packet with the first four
bytes of the payload being 0x13426974 (“<13>Bit”).
For SIP packets, the system detects a SIP INVITE or BYE packet, extracts the
entire domain from both the To: and From: portion of the SIP URI, sdbm hashes both
the To: and From: domains to create two unique hashes, compares the hashes against
a blacklist containing the suspicious hashes (each four bytes in length), and logs it if
either the To: or From: hashes are on the blacklist. A SIP INVITE packet is defined
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as a UDP packet with the first four bytes of the UDP payload being “INVI”. A SIP
BYE packet is defined as a UDP packet with the first four bytes of the UDP payload
being “BYE ”. It is possible for a SIP packet to have the To: and From: domains be
the same. This occurs if both sender and receiver are communicating through the
same SIP proxy server. Refer to Section 2.1.2 for more information about the SIP
packet.
Figure 3.2: Packet Data Flow in the TRacking and Analysis for Peer-to-Peer 2
System.
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For DNS packets, the system detects a DNS request, extracts the entire domain,
sdbm hashes the domain to create a four-byte unique hash, compares the hash against
a whitelist of approved domain hashes, and logs it if it is not on the DNS whitelist.
A DNS request is defined as a UDP packet with a destination port of 53. DNS zone
transfers, performed over TCP port 53, are not included because they are not capable
of exfiltrating data.
3.3 System Boundaries
The System Under Test (SUT) for this research is the TRAPP-2 system. The
SUT block diagram is illustrated in Figure 3.3. The SUT components include:
TRAPP-2 software, FPGA and board, PowerPC Processor, System Timer, Ether-
net Controller, two 512 MB SDRAM modules, and a serial RS232 controller. The
Component Under Test (CUT) is the TRAPP-2 software.
The workload parameters include the type of BitTorrent, SIP, DNS, and non-
BitTorrent/SIP/DNS packet, as well as a network load. The single system parameter
is the hash list size. The metrics include the packet processing time and the probability
of packet intercept.
Figure 3.3: The TRacking and Analysis for Peer-to-Peer 2 System Under Test.
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3.4 System Services
The TRAPP-2 system assists network administrators, law enforcement officials,
and intelligence agencies in detecting and tracking traffic of interest. The system
resides between a local area network and the Internet gateway and receives all the
traffic flowing through the gateway. Figure 3.2 illustrates the functionality of the
TRAPP-2 system.
The system is successful when the following steps are all completed:
1. A BitTorrent handshake packet, a SIP INVITE or BYE packet, or a DNS request
is detected.
2. The respective file info hash, SIP URIs, or DNS domain are extracted.
3. (SIP/DNS only) The domain is sdbm hashed.
4. The hash is compared against separate lists of interest for BitTorrent, SIP, and
DNS packets.
5. If a match is found for the BitTorrent and SIP packets, the packet contents
are written to a Wireshark-compatible log file. For DNS, if the DNS hash is
not found on the DNS hash whitelist, the packet is written to a Wireshark-
compatible log file.
A system service failure occurs when:
1. The system does not detect a packet of interest when one is present.
2. A packet of interest is detected but the file info hash, SIP URIs, or DNS domain
are not extracted.
3. The packet information is not written to the log file.
As with the TRAPP-1 system, false positives are not considered. The assump-
tion is that an administrator will review the contents of the log file to validate the
packets of interest [Sch09]. For BitTorrent, SIP, and DNS, a 4-byte hash is compared
against the hash list resulting in a probability of collision of 1 in 4,294,967,296 (232).
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The TRAPP-2 system can be configured to compare larger hashes to decrease false
positives and the probability of collision.
3.5 Workload
The workload for the TRAPP-2 SUT consists of BitTorrent/SIP/DNS packets, a
non-BitTorrent/SIP/DNS packet, and a network load. To reduce the number of packet
type factors, specific packets are selected for the BitTorrent/SIP/DNS workload. Each
protocol has a worst- and best-case packet for packets of interest, and only a worst-
case packet for uninteresting packets. This allows a range of packet processing times
to be established by using the extremes for each protocol.
Additionally, it is important to generate packets on the network that are Bit-
Torrent, SIP, or DNS packets, but not of interest. These packets ensure that the
system detects the three protocols, but the hash is not of interest. For uninteresting
packets, only the worst-case scenario packet is selected.
For each of the protocols, a weighted system is used to select the worst- and best-
case scenarios for each packet type. Certain characteristics of each packet determine
the effectiveness of the TRAPP-2 system. Packets acquire points for having certain
characteristics. For each type of protocol, the packets with the least amount of points
(best-case) and most amount of points (worst-case) are used. The points are further
explained under each characteristic. The characteristics used for packet selection
include:
1. Hash is on/off the hash list
2. The location of the hash on the hash list
3. (SIP/DNS only) The size of the packet in bytes
4. (SIP/DNS only) The length of the domain required to sdbm hash
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3.5.1 Packet Workload Characteristics.
3.5.1.1 Hash Is On/Off the Hash List. If a BitTorrent or SIP packet
has a hash on the blacklist, then it must be logged, which requires additional CPU
cycles. If a DNS packet does not have a hash on the whitelist, then it must be logged,
which requires additional CPU cycles. For the weighted system, a packet gets 1 point
for having a hash on the hash list (for BitTorrent and SIP) or 1 point for having a
hash off the hash list (for DNS).
3.5.1.2 Location of Hash on the Hash List. The location of the hash
on the hash list affects the number of CPU cycles used by the binary search algorithm.
If the hash is in the middle of the list, the binary search algorithm finds it on the first
try, thus requiring the fewest CPU cycles. If the hash is at the end of the list, or off
the list, the algorithm requires the most comparisons, and thus more CPU cycles, to
locate the hash. For the weighted system, a packet gets 1 point if its hash is at worst
possible location on the hash list (for BitTorrent and SIP) or 1 point if it is off the
list (for DNS).
3.5.1.3 SIP/DNS Only: Size of the Packet. Since the TRAPP-2
system must copy the entire packet into a software buffer, the size of the packet affects
how quickly this is accomplished. Pilot tests reveal that 67-byte packets averaged 999
CPU cycles and 1500-byte packets averaged 18,112 CPU cycles. Thus, the size of the
packet impacts the amount of CPU cycles required to process it. For the weighted
system, a packet gets 1 point for being the largest. BitTorrent handshake packets
do not exceed 122 bytes so only one packet size is used. The pilot test data for the
packet size transfer times can be found in Appendix B.
3.5.1.4 SIP/DNS Only: Length of Domain. Since the sdbm hashing
function is utilized in the TRAPP-2 system, the domain length of SIP URIs and DNS
requests affect the number of CPU cycles required to generate the four-byte hash.
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Refer to Section 3.2.2 for the specific numbers. For the weighted system, a SIP/DNS
packet gets 1 point if it has the largest possible domain.
3.5.2 BitTorrent Workload. The different possible types of BitTorrent pack-
ets are illustrated in Figure 3.4. The hierarchy is read from left to right. One type of
packet, for example, is a BitTorrent packet with a hash on the hash list, with a hash
located in the worst hash list location. This can be abbreviated as BT-ON-WORST.
Unlike SIP or DNS packets, the size of the BitTorrent handshake packet does not
exceed 122 bytes, so the packet size characteristic is eliminated. See Section 2.1.1 for
more details about the contents of the BitTorrent handshake packet.
Figure 3.4: BitTorrent Packet Type Hierarchy for the TRacking and Analysis for
Peer-to-Peer 2 System.
Using the weighted packet system, the scores for each type of BitTorrent packet
are in Table 3.1, with the selected BitTorrent workload packets in bold. In the case
of BitTorrent packets on the list, the best-case scenario packet is the BT-ON-BEST,
with a score of 1. The worst-case scenario packet is the BT-ON-WORST, with a score
of 2. For BitTorrent packets not on the list, the worst-case scenario packet is BT-
OFF with a score of 0. So, in the case of BitTorrent packets, all three combinations
of BitTorrent packets are used.
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Table 3.1: BitTorrent Packet Weights for the TRacking and Analysis for Peer-to-
Peer 2 System.
Protocol On/Off Hash List Best/Worst Hash Location Total
BT ON 1 BEST 0 1
ON 1 WORST 1 2
OFF 0 - 0 0
BOLD = Selected BitTorrent Workload Packet
To summarize, the three types of BitTorrent packets used are:
1. BT-ON-BEST: A 122-byte BitTorrent packet with a hash on the hash list at
the best location (middle of the hash list).
2. BT-ON-WORST: A 122-byte BitTorrent packet with a hash on the hash list at
the worst location (beginning of the hash list).
3. BT-OFF: A 122-byte BitTorrent packet with a hash not on the hash list.
3.5.2.1 BitTorrent Workload Packets. Three types of BitTorrent pack-
ets are used. The contents of BT-ON-BEST:
00 1c 23 18 d9 db 00 1c 23 0f 6e c9 08 00 45 00 ..#.....#.n...E.
00 6c 0c 1a 40 00 80 06 6b 1e c0 a8 01 02 c0 a8 .l..@...k.......
01 01 04 64 e8 84 65 63 a1 48 4c 7d 0b 05 50 18 ...d..ec.HL}..P.
ff ff 7e 9d 00 00 13 42 69 74 54 6f 72 72 65 6e ..~....BitTorren
74 20 70 72 6f 74 6f 63 6f 6c 00 00 00 00 00 10 t protocol......
00 05 68 37 67 65 b8 c6 60 98 5b df 3c 30 cd bf ..h7ge..‘.[.<0..
e5 7d fd 36 76 13 2d 55 54 32 30 30 30 2d 00 46 .}.6v.-UT2000-.F
6c e5 aa e6 bc 6a d0 02 58 95 l....j..X.
The contents of BT-ON-WORST:
00 1c 23 18 d9 db 00 1c 23 0f 6e c9 08 00 45 00 ..#.....#.n...E.
00 6c 0c 1a 40 00 80 06 6b 1e c0 a8 01 02 c0 a8 .l..@...k.......
01 01 04 64 e8 84 65 63 a1 48 4c 7d 0b 05 50 18 ...d..ec.HL}..P.
ff ff b7 9d 00 00 13 42 69 74 54 6f 72 72 65 6e .......BitTorren
74 20 70 72 6f 74 6f 63 6f 6c 00 00 00 00 00 10 t protocol......
00 05 30 30 66 6c b8 c6 60 98 5b df 3c 30 cd bf ..00fl..‘.[.<0..
e5 7d fd 36 76 13 2d 55 54 32 30 30 30 2d 00 46 .}.6v.-UT2000-.F
6c e5 aa e6 bc 6a d0 02 58 95 l....j..X.
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The contents of BT-OFF:
00 1c 23 18 d9 db 00 1c 23 0f 6e c9 08 00 45 00 ..#.....#.n...E.
00 6c 0c 1a 40 00 80 06 6b 1e c0 a8 01 02 c0 a8 .l..@...k.......
01 01 04 64 e8 84 65 63 a1 48 4c 7d 0b 05 50 18 ...d..ec.HL}..P.
ff ff b4 fa 00 00 13 42 69 74 54 6f 72 72 65 6e .......BitTorren
74 20 70 72 6f 74 6f 63 6f 6c 00 00 00 00 00 10 t protocol......
00 05 d0 66 c8 d8 b8 c6 60 98 5b df 3c 30 cd bf ...f....‘.[.<0..
e5 7d fd 36 76 13 2d 55 54 32 30 30 30 2d 00 46 .}.6v.-UT2000-.F
6c e5 aa e6 bc 6a d0 02 58 95 l....j..X.
3.5.3 SIP Workload. The different SIP packet type combinations are illus-
trated in Figure 3.5. The hierarchy is read from left to right. One type of packet,
for example, is a SIP INVITE packet with a hash on the hash list, small in byte
size, with a hash located in the best hash list location. This can be abbreviated as
SIP-INVITE-ON-SMALL-BEST.
Figure 3.5: Session Initiation Protocol Packet Type Hierarchy for the TRacking
and Analysis for Peer-to-Peer 2 System.
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Using the weighted packet system, the scores for each type of SIP INVITE
packet are in Table 3.2, with the selected SIP INVITE workload packets in bold.
In the case of SIP INVITE packets on the list, the best-case scenario packet is the
SIP-INVITE-ON-SMALL-BEST, with a score of 1. The worst-case scenario for a SIP
INVITE packet is the SIP-INVITE-ON-LARGE-WORST, with a score of 3. For SIP
INVITE packets not on the list, the worst-case scenario packet is the SIP-INVITE-
OFF-LARGE with a score of 1.
Table 3.2: Session Initiation Protocol INVITE Packet Weights for the TRacking
and Analysis for Peer-to-Peer 2 System.
Protocol INV/BYE On/Off Packet Size Best/Worst Total
Hash List Hash Location
SIP INV ON 1 SMALL 0 BEST 0 1
INV ON 1 SMALL 0 WORST 1 2
INV ON 1 LARGE 1 BEST 0 2
INV ON 1 LARGE 1 WORST 1 3
INV OFF 0 SMALL 0 - - 0
INV OFF 0 LARGE 1 - - 1
BOLD = Selected SIP INVITE Workload Packet
As a reminder, the TRAPP-2 system is looking for both SIP INVITE and SIP
BYE packets. Using the weighted packet system for SIP BYE packets, the scores for
each type are in Table 3.3, with the selected SIP BYE workload packets in bold. The
best-case scenario for SIP BYE packets is the SIP-BYE-ON-SMALL-BEST, with a
score of 1. The worst-case scenario for SIP BYE packets is the SIP-BYE-ON-LARGE-
WORST, with a score of 3. The SIP BYE packet with a URI not on the list (OFF)
is omitted for two reasons. The first is that from the viewpoint of the TRAPP-2
software, the packets are the same. Secondly, the SIP INVITE will take longer to
process because of the larger packet size and thus represents the worst-case between
the two.
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Table 3.3: Session Initiation Protocol BYE Packet Weights for the TRacking and
Analysis for Peer-to-Peer 2 System.
Protocol INV/BYE On/Off Packet Size Best/Worst Total
Hash List Hash Location
SIP BYE ON 1 SMALL 0 BEST 0 1
BYE ON 1 SMALL 0 WORST 1 2
BYE ON 1 LARGE 1 BEST 0 2
BYE ON 1 LARGE 1 WORST 1 3
BOLD = Selected SIP BYE Workload Packet
To summarize, the five types of SIP packets used are:
1. SIP-INVITE-ON-SMALL-BEST: A 932-byte SIP INVITE packet with a hash
on the hash list at the best location.
2. SIP-INVITE-ON-LARGE-WORST: A 1500-byte SIP INVITE packet with a
hash on the hash list at the worst location.
3. SIP-INVITE-OFF-LARGE: A 1500-byte SIP INVITE packet with a hash not
on the hash list.
4. SIP-BYE-ON-SMALL-BEST: A 479-byte SIP BYE packet with a hash on the
hash list at the best location.
5. SIP-BYE-ON-LARGE-WORST: A 1040-byte SIP BYE packet with a hash on
the hash list at the worst location.
3.5.3.1 SIP Workload Packets. Five types of SIP packets are used.
The length of the domain affects the size of the SIP packet. For small packets, the
domain 192.168.3.110 is used. For large packets, the artificially created domain
below is used:
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefgh
ijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnop
qrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwx
yz.com.localhost
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The contents of SIP-INVITE-ON-SMALL-BEST:
INVITE sip:2000@192.168.3.110 SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.3:39966;branch=z9hG4bK-d8754z-
be20982fbb7fb76f-1---d8754z-;rport
Max-Forwards: 70
Contact: <sip:2001@192.168.1.3:39966>
To: "2000"<sip:2000@192.168.3.110>
From: "Beta"<sip:2001@192.168.3.110>;tag=5c4c0451
Call-ID: MGIwNTdiMDI5NzU2YzhmMDEzYzMxMzU2Y2QzOWRhODQ.
CSeq: 1 INVITE
Allow: INVITE, ACK, CANCEL, OPTIONS, BYE, REFER, NOTIFY,
MESSAGE, SUBSCRIBE, INFO
Content-Type: application/sdp
User-Agent: X-Lite release 1104o stamp 56125
Content-Length: 360
The contents of SIP-INVITE-ON-LARGE-WORST:
INVITE sip:2001@abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvw
xyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefgh
ijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrst
uvwxyz.com.localhost SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.2:57538;branch=z9hG4bK-d8754z-
a160be13fe074026-1---d8754z-;rport
Max-Forwards: 70
Contact: <sip:2000@192.168.1.2:57538>
To: "2001"<sip:2001@abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmno
pqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvw
xyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcd
efghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.com.localhost>
From: "Alpha"<sip:2000@abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijkl
mnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrst
uvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.a
bcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.com.localhost>;tag=8356d139
Call-ID: M2UwNmQ3MDVlNjc0MzA5ODE4ZmFlMWU2ZmU2MzhiMWI.
CSeq: 1 INVITE
Allow: INVITE, ACK, CANCEL, OPTIONS, BYE, REFER, NOTIFY, MESSAGE,
SUBSCRIBE, INFO
Content-Type: application/sdp
User-Agent: X-Lite release 1104o stamp 56125
Content-Length: 360
47
The contents of SIP-INVITE-OFF-LARGE (note that 1234 replaced abcd for
the first four characters of the domain):
INVITE sip:2001@1234efghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvw
xyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefgh
ijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrst
uvwxyz.com.localhost SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.2:57538;branch=z9hG4bK-d8754z-
a160be13fe074026-1---d8754z-;rport
Max-Forwards: 70
Contact: <sip:2000@192.168.1.2:57538>
To: "2001"<sip:2001@1234efghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmno
pqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvw
xyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcd
efghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.com.localhost>
From: "Alpha"<sip:2000@1234efghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijkl
mnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrst
uvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.a
bcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.com.localhost>;tag=8356d139
Call-ID: M2UwNmQ3MDVlNjc0MzA5ODE4ZmFlMWU2ZmU2MzhiMWI.
CSeq: 1 INVITE
Allow: INVITE, ACK, CANCEL, OPTIONS, BYE, REFER, NOTIFY, MESSAGE,
SUBSCRIBE, INFO
Content-Type: application/sdp
User-Agent: X-Lite release 1104o stamp 56125
Content-Length: 360
The contents of SIP-BYE-ON-SMALL-BEST:
BYE sip:2001@192.168.1.3:39966 SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.3.110:5060;branch=z9hG4bK14b4f667;rport
Max-Forwards: 70
From: "2000"<sip:2000@192.168.3.110>;tag=as758a70a9
To: "Beta"<sip:2001@192.168.3.110>;tag=5c4c0451
Call-ID: MGIwNTdiMDI5NzU2YzhmMDEzYzMxMzU2Y2QzOWRhODQ.
CSeq: 102 BYE
User-Agent: Asterisk PBX 1.6.0.10-FONCORE-r40
X-Asterisk-HangupCause: Normal Clearing
X-Asterisk-HangupCauseCode: 16
Content-Length: 0
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The contents of SIP-BYE-ON-LARGE-WORST:
BYE sip:2001@192.168.1.5 SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.2:57538;branch=z9hG4bK-d8754z-
014fc825e962763e-1---d8754z-;rport
Max-Forwards: 70
Contact: <sip:2000@192.168.1.2:57538>
To: "2001"<sip:2001@abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmno
pqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvw
xyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcd
efghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.com.localhost>;tag=as22d800eb
From: "Alpha"<sip:2000@abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijkl
mnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrst
uvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.a
bcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.com.localhost>;tag=8356d139
Call-ID: M2UwNmQ3MDVlNjc0MzA5ODE4ZmFlMWU2ZmU2MzhiMWI.
CSeq: 3 BYE
User-Agent: X-Lite release 1104o stamp 56125
Authorization: Digest username="2000",realm="asterisk",nonce="669dc6aa",
uri="sip:2001@192.168.1.5",response="91d3092c48e35c3275c4f2f47e57336d",
algorithm=MD5
Reason: SIP;description="User Hung Up"
Content-Length: 0
3.5.4 DNS Workload. The different possible types of DNS packets are
illustrated in Figure 3.6. The hierarchy is read from left to right. One type of packet,
for example, is a DNS packet with a hash on the whitelist, large in byte size, with
a hash located in the worst location. This can be abbreviated as DNS-ON-LARGE-
WORST.
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Figure 3.6: Domain Name System Packet Type Hierarchy for the TRacking and
Analysis for Peer-to-Peer 2 System.
Using the weighted packet system, the scores for each type of DNS packet are
in Table 3.4, with the selected DNS workload packets in bold. For DNS packets
with hashes not on the whitelist (the ones of interest), the best-case scenario is the
DNS-OFF-SMALL packet, with a score of 1. The worst-case scenario packet is the
DNS-OFF-LARGE packet, with a score of 2. For valid DNS domains on the whitelist,
the worst-case scenario is the DNS-ON-LARGE-WORST packet, with a score of 2.
Table 3.4: Domain Name System Packet Weights for the TRacking and Analysis
for Peer-to-Peer 2 System.
Protocol On/Off hash list Packet Size Best/Worst hash location Total
DNS OFF 1 SMALL 0 - 1 1
OFF 1 LARGE 1 - 1 2
ON 0 SMALL 0 BEST 0 0
ON 0 SMALL 0 WORST 1 1
ON 0 LARGE 1 BEST 0 1
ON 0 LARGE 1 WORST 1 2
BOLD = Selected DNS Workload Packet
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To summarize, the three types of DNS packets used are:
1. DNS-OFF-SMALL: A 67-byte DNS request packet with a hash not on the hash
list
2. DNS-OFF-LARGE: A 190-byte DNS request packet not on the hash list. The
packet is generated using Iodine [Kry09], a DNS exfiltration tool. The authen-
ticity of the malicious packet is selected over a larger actual byte size, which
can be achieved by increasing the domain length.
3. DNS-ON-LARGE-WORST: A 190-byte DNS request packet with a hash on the
hash list in the worst location
3.5.4.1 DNS Workload Packets. Three types of DNS packets are used.
The contents of DNS-OFF-SMALL:
00 0f 1f 69 b9 87 00 1e ec f2 99 ca 08 00 45 00 ...i..........E.
00 35 39 3c 40 00 40 11 e9 18 0a 01 02 5c 0a 01 .59<@.@......\..
02 06 c2 a3 00 35 00 21 64 cd d7 ff 01 00 00 01 .....5.!d.......
00 00 00 00 00 00 03 63 6e 6e 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 .......cnn.com..
01 00 01 ...
The contents of DNS-OFF-LARGE:
00 1f 3b 81 3f b7 00 0c 41 78 26 63 08 00 45 00 ..;.?...Ax&c..E.
00 b0 e4 8d 40 00 7d 11 8c 56 47 40 91 da d9 d9 ....@.}..VG@....
d9 64 11 5c 00 35 00 9c 4d 09 02 8b 01 00 00 01 .d.\.5..M.......
00 00 00 00 00 01 3d 30 61 64 62 45 6e 50 4a 79 ......=0adbEnPJy
67 72 47 43 67 76 47 53 68 4e 73 5a 43 64 71 57 grGCgvGShNsZCdqW
70 48 70 43 69 2d 61 61 58 6d 71 6d 32 69 57 4d pHpCi-aaXmqm2iWM
6d 41 57 6d 69 47 57 6a 63 79 4c 50 35 73 4d 50 mAWmiGWjcyLP5sMP
77 44 4b 7a 1b 4d 78 4e 34 6f 42 4c 66 58 71 77 wDKz.MxN4oBLfXqw
66 7a 45 75 4c 50 78 64 48 71 68 5a 5a 72 6c 56 fzEuLPxdHqhZZrlV
08 72 65 73 65 61 72 63 68 10 72 61 6e 64 6f 6d .research.random
68 61 63 6b 65 72 73 69 74 65 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 hackersite.com..
0a 00 01 00 00 29 10 00 00 00 80 00 00 00 .....)........
51
The contents of DNS-ON-LARGE-WORST:
00 1f 3b 81 3f b7 00 0c 41 78 26 63 08 00 45 00 ..;.?...Ax&c..E.
00 b0 e4 8d 40 00 7d 11 8c 56 47 40 91 da d9 d9 ....@.}..VG@....
d9 64 11 5c 00 35 00 9c d0 f5 02 8b 01 00 00 01 .d.\.5..........
00 00 00 00 00 01 03 70 69 63 74 75 72 65 73 2e .......pictures.
6d 61 69 6c 62 6f 78 2e 66 75 74 75 72 65 74 65 mailbox.futurete
63 68 6e 6f 6c 6f 67 79 64 65 73 69 67 6e 2e 74 chnologydesign.t
65 63 68 6e 69 63 61 6c 64 65 74 61 69 6c 73 67 echnicaldetailsg
72 6f 75 70 2e 73 75 70 70 6f 72 74 62 72 61 6e roup.supportbran
63 68 2e 65 6e 67 69 6e 65 65 72 69 6e 67 64 69 ch.engineeringdi
76 69 73 69 6f 6e 2e 73 75 70 65 72 6c 6f 6e 67 vision.superlong
63 6f 6d 70 61 6e 79 6e 61 6d 65 2e 63 6f 6d 00 companyname.com.
00 0a 00 01 00 00 29 10 00 00 00 80 00 00 ......).......
3.5.5 Non-BitTorrent/SIP/DNS Workload. The non-BitTorrent/SIP/DNS
packet used is an HTTP packet. Its signature does not match that of a BitTorrent,
SIP, or DNS packet. The HTTP packet is 389 bytes in size. The average size packet of
an hour-long Wireshark network capture from a lab network with multiple computers
accessing the Internet is 389 bytes. The contents of the HTTP packet:
00 1e 4f f2 7f 8d 00 0b fd 0d 26 a1 08 00 45 00 ..O.......&...E.
01 77 cf 35 00 00 30 06 34 1e 4a 7d 2f 65 0a 01 .w.5..0.4.J}/e..
02 4b 00 50 09 6c 3c 00 d4 25 f2 b4 eb 98 50 18 .K.P.l<..%....P.
e6 a0 e9 9f 00 00 48 54 54 50 2f 31 2e 31 20 32 ......HTTP/1.1 2
30 30 20 4f 4b 0d 0a 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 2d 54 00 OK..Content-T
79 70 65 3a 20 74 65 78 74 2f 6a 61 76 61 73 63 ype: text/javasc
72 69 70 74 3b 20 63 68 61 72 73 65 74 3d 75 74 ript; charset=ut
66 2d 38 0d 0a 44 61 74 65 3a 20 54 68 75 2c 20 f-8..Date: Thu,
32 30 20 41 75 67 20 32 30 30 39 20 31 33 3a 31 20 Aug 2009 13:1
30 3a 31 34 20 47 4d 54 0d 0a 45 78 70 69 72 65 0:14 GMT..Expire
73 3a 20 54 68 75 2c 20 32 30 20 41 75 67 20 32 s: Thu, 20 Aug 2
30 30 39 20 31 34 3a 31 30 3a 31 34 20 47 4d 54 009 14:10:14 GMT
0d 0a 43 61 63 68 65 2d 43 6f 6e 74 72 6f 6c 3a ..Cache-Control:
20 70 75 62 6c 69 63 2c 20 6d 61 78 2d 61 67 65 public, max-age
3d 33 36 30 30 0d 0a 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 2d 45 =3600..Content-E
6e 63 6f 64 69 6e 67 3a 20 67 7a 69 70 0d 0a 53 ncoding: gzip..S
65 72 76 65 72 3a 20 41 75 74 6f 2d 43 6f 6d 70 erver: Auto-Comp
6c 65 74 69 6f 6e 20 53 65 72 76 65 72 0d 0a 43 letion Server..C
6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 2d 4c 65 6e 67 74 68 3a 20 38 ontent-Length: 8
52
30 0d 0a 0d 0a 1f 8b 08 00 00 00 00 00 02 ff 2b 0..............+
cf cc 4b c9 2f d7 4b cf cf 4f cf 49 d5 4b 4c d6 ..K./.K..O.I.KL.
cb d0 88 56 ca c9 2c 4b 2d cb 4c 2d 57 28 4a 4d ...V..,K-.L-W(JM
4c d1 cd cf cb a9 54 28 2b 86 70 ca 8b 32 4b 52 L.....T(+.p..2KR
15 ca 72 cb 13 8b 94 74 a2 63 63 35 01 a4 14 cf ..r....t.cc5....
db 41 00 00 00 .A...
3.5.6 Network Load. For Experiment 3, a network load consisting of non-
BitTorrent/SIP/DNS traffic is added to the system using the Linux pktgen util-
ity [Fou10]. By adding the load, the resulting minimum network utilization is ap-
proximately 20% and is increased at 10% intervals up to the maximum acheivable
rate of 93.7% (equivalent to 937 Mbps). Table 3.5 summarizes the different network
utilizations achieved as a result of adding the Linux pktgen utility load. In Experi-
ment 3, the network utilization is measured using variables within the Linux pktgen
utility, described in Section 3.6.3.2.
Table 3.5: Network Utilizations Due to the Linux pktgen Utility Load in the TRack-
ing and Analysis for Peer-to-Peer 2 System.
Mbps Network Utilization %
(Mbps/1000)
204 20.4%
301 30.1%
408 40.8%
498 49.8%
602 60.2%
714 71.4%
818 81.8%
937 93.7%
3.6 Performance Metrics
The two performance metrics used to evaluate the effectiveness of the TRAPP-
2 system are packet processing time and the probability of packet intercept. This
section also describes how the Network Utilization is measured for the experiments.
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3.6.1 Packet Processing Time. The first metric is the packet processing
time, which measures the CPU cycles used to process packets. The PowerPC’s System
Timer timestamp function is used for this. The packet processing time begins when
a packet arrives in the Ethernet controller. Packet processing time ends immediately
after processing of the packet has completed. This metric is important because packet
processing time must be minimized to check every packet traversing the network.
Measuring the packet processing time also gives insight into how the TRAPP-2 system
responds to different packet type characteristics (Experiment 1) and hash list sizes
(Experiment 4).
3.6.2 Probability of Packet Intercept. The second metric is the probability
of packet intercept. This is calculated by determining if a packet of interest is cap-
tured and successfully recorded to the log file. When measuring the probability of
packet intercept, the network utilization of the system is also measured. Experiment
2 measures the probability of packet intercept while flooding the TRAPP-2 system
with protocol-under-test (BitTorrent, SIP, or DNS) traffic. The Linux utility, tcpre-
play, is used to send a previously captured .pcap file containing 400 packets of interest
as quickly as possible [Tcp10]. Experiment 3 measures the probability of packet in-
tercept of packets of interest while adding a non-BitTorrent/SIP/DNS traffic load to
the TRAPP-2 system. The load is generated using the Linux pktgen utility.
3.6.3 Network Utilization. The network utilization is the total amount
of traffic entering the TRAPP-2 system. For Experiment 1 and Experiment 4, the
network utilization is limited to single packets injected into the system, and is thus
virtually zero. For Experiment 2, the network utilization varies with the type of
protocol-under-test packet being flooded into the system. In Experiment 2, the net-
work utilization is measured using Wireshark. For Experiment 3, the network utiliza-
tion varies with the type of load generated by the Linux pktgen utility. In Experiment
3, the network utilization is measured using variables within the Linux pktgen utility.
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3.6.3.1 Measuring Network Utilization Using Wireshark. For Exper-
iment 2, the load is measured using the Wireshark laptop connected to the gigabit
switch’s other Switched Port Analyzer (SPAN) port. When each test has concluded,
the network utilization is measured by selecting the Statistics -> Summary menu
option and recording the Avg. MBit/sec from the Displayed column. This is as-
sumed to be the minimum network utilization.
3.6.3.2 Measuring the Network Utilization Using the Linux pktgen Utility
Variables. For Experiment 3, the Linux pktgen utility generates packets faster than
Wireshark can process. In response to Wireshark’s shortfall, an alternative method to
measure the network utilization is necessary. To accomplish this, two variables must
be determined to calculate the network utilization rate of megabits per second. The
first is the number of bits generated on the network and the second is the amount of
time elapsed to send those bits.
The Linux pktgen utility is a Bourne Again SHell (BASH) script that runs in a
terminal. The Linux pktgen utility allows configuration of the packet size, number of
packets, and delay. The number of packets and packet size remain static, at 6,000,000
packets and 1,500 bytes, respectively. The delay variable is modified to achieve the
different network utilization percentages.
A timestamp function within the BASH scripting language is used to record the
number of nanoseconds since January 1, 1970. This timestamp function is taken right
before the Linux pktgen utility begins and immediately after completion. As a result,
the total amount of time required to send the 6,000,000 packets is known. Since both
variables are known, the megabits per second network utilization can be calculated
using the formula:
Network Utilization =
Packets × Packet Size (Bytes) × (1MB
220B
) × 8 Bits
Byte
Elapsed T ime
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Where Packets is 6,000,000, Packet Size is 1,500 and Elapsed Time is measured
using the BASH timestamp function. A delay variable within the Linux pktgen util-
ity BASH script is modified to throttle this rate to achieve the decreased network
utilizations.
3.7 System Parameters
The single TRAPP-2 system parameter is the hash list size. For Experiments
1, 2, and 3, a hash list size of 1000 is used. For Experiment 4, the hash list size is
doubled from 2,000 up to 131,072,000 unique hash items. This results in 17 different
hash list sizes. The hash list with 131,072,000 items is 500 MB in size, which is 97.65%
of the available SDRAM memory. 100% of the memory is not used because the same
memory space is used to store the log file.
The TRAPP-2 workload parameters include:
1. BitTorrent Packet Types: There are three types of BitTorrent packet types.
They include BT-ON-BEST, BT-ON-WORST, and BT-OFF.
2. SIP Packet Types: There are five types of SIP packet types. They include SIP-
INVITE-ON-SMALL-BEST, SIP-INVITE-ON-LARGE-WORST,
SIP-INVITE-OFF-LARGE, SIP-BYE-ON-SMALL-BEST, and SIP-BYE-ON-
LARGE-WORST.
3. DNS Packet Types: There are three types of DNS packet types. They include
DNS-OFF-SMALL, DNS-OFF-LARGE, and DNS-ON-LARGE-WORST.
4. Non-BitTorrent/SIP/DNS Packet: This is the 389-byte HTTP packet.
5. Network Load: The additional network traffic added to the system using the
Linux pktgen utility. An additional traffic load is only added in Experiment 3.
3.8 Factors
For Experiments 1, 2, and 3, the TRAPP-2 software is loaded onto the FPGA
board. The FPGA’s Ethernet controller is configured to run at 1000 Mbps, and the
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list of interest size is 1000 entries. Experiment 1 calculates the packet processing time
of BitTorrent, SIP, DNS, and non-BitTorrent/SIP/DNS (the HTTP packet) packets.
Experiment 2 determines the probability of packet intercept for a flood (400 packets)
of protocol-under-test (BitTorrent, SIP, or DNS) traffic. The four packets selected
are the worst-case for BitTorrent, SIP INVITE, SIP BYE, and DNS. Realistically,
the TRAPP-2 system will not see the same packet sent as quickly as possible, but
the purpose of the experiment is to stress the system. Experiment 3 determines the
probability of packet intercept under the addition of eight different network loads.
Table 3.6 summarizes the factor levels for Experiments 1, 2, and 3.
Table 3.6: Factor Levels for Experiments 1, 2, and 3, for the TRacking and Analysis
for Peer-to-Peer 2 System.
Factor Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6
Packet Type Non BT ON BT ON BT OFF SIP INV ON SIP INV ON
BT/SIP/DNS WORST BEST SMALL BEST LARGE WORST
Approximate
Network Load None 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Level 7 Level 8 Level 9 Level 10 Level 11 Level 12
SIP INV SIP BYE ON SIP BYE ON DNS OFF DNS OFF DNS ON
OFF LARGE SMALL BEST LARGE WORST SMALL LARGE LARGE WORST
70% 80% 93%
Experiment 4 tests how increasing the hash list size affects the packet processing
time. The line speed of 1000 Mbps remains the same and the TRAPP-2 software
is unchanged. Only large DNS packets not on the whitelist are used (DNS-OFF-
LARGE). This ensures that the binary search algorithm is exhausted and that the
packet is logged as suspicious. Table 3.7 summarizes the factor levels for Experiment
4.
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Table 3.7: Factor Levels for Experiment 4 for the TRacking and Analysis for Peer-
to-Peer 2 System.
Factor Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6
DNS Hash List Size 2,000 4,000 8,000 16,000 32,000 64,000
Level 7 Level 8 Level 9 Level 10 Level 11 Level 12
128,000 256,000 512,000 1,024,000 2,048,000 4,096,000
Level 13 Level 14 Level 15 Level 16 Level 17
8,192,000 16,384,000 32,768,000 65,536,000 131,072,000
3.9 Evaluation Technique
Direct measurement is selected as the evaluation technique for the experiments
because the TRAPP-2 system is a real and physical system. The experimental hard-
ware configuration setup is on the right side of Figure 3.7. The same network is used
to create the packets of interest. The packet creation configuration is on the left side
of Figure 3.7. The packet creation laptops are disconnected from the network prior
to conducting the experiments.
The experimental configuration consists of the following hardware:
• 1 Cisco gigabit 24-port switch (model WS-C3560G-24PS-S). The switch is con-
figured with 22 standard ports and 2 SPAN ports.
• 1 Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA (model FXT ML510), the SUT, connected to one of
the switch’s SPAN ports.
• 1 Dell Latitude D630 laptop loaded with the Windows’s XP Service Pack 3
Operating System. It contains Wireshark 1.0.5 [Wir09], connected to the other
switch’s SPAN port, acting as the control packet sniffer. This laptop is also
used to program the FPGA via Universal Serial Bus and provide Standard
Input/Output for the FPGA through a RS232 interface.
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• 1 Dell Latitude D630 laptop loaded with Backtrack 4 [RE10] and the tcpreplay
utility, version 3.4.3 [Tcp10], to inject packets into the network.
• 1 Dell Latitude D630 loaded with the Ubuntu Desktop 9.10 Operating Sys-
tem. This laptop contains the Linux pktgen utility to create different network
utilizations on the network.
Figure 3.7: Packet Creation and Experimental Hardware Configuration Setup for
the TRacking and Analysis for Peer-to-Peer 2 System.
The packet creation configuration consists of the following hardware:
• 2 Dell Latitude D630 laptops loaded with the Window’s XP Service Pack 3 Op-
erating System. They both contain uTorrent 2.0 [uTo10] and X-Lite 3.0 [Cou10],
BitTorrent and VoIP clients, respectively.
• 1 Dell Latitude D630 laptop loaded with trixbox 2.8.0.3 [Tri10], based on Cen-
tOS release 5.4, acting as the SIP proxy and registrar server for the X-Lite VoIP
clients.
• 1 Dell Inspiron 640m laptop loaded with Ubuntu Server 9.10 used as a DNS
server. The DNS server is required to create SIP packets that contain large
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domain names. This server is not used for any of the malicious DNS packet
creation. The malicious DNS packets are created using Iodine [Kry09].
The actual experimental setup is shown in Figure 3.8.
Figure 3.8: Experimental Setup for the TRacking and Analysis for Peer-to-Peer 2
System.
3.9.1 Calculating Packet Processing Time. For Experiment 1 and Experi-
ment 4, a series of 50 packets is sent from the Backtrack laptop using the tcpreplay
utility. Using 50 packets allows for sufficiently small confidence intervals to compare
the results. For each of the three replications, a series of 50 packets is sent and the
number of CPU cycles required to process the packet is recorded. Prior to sending
the 50 packets, five packets are sent to the system to “warm up” the board by caching
the data and instructions used by the processor. No additional network utilization is
injected into the system.
3.9.2 Calculating Probability of Packet Intercept. For Experiment 2, a series
of 400 packets is sent as fast as possible from the Backtrack laptop using the tcpreplay
utility. For each of the three replications, a series of 400 protocol-under-test packets is
flooded into the TRAPP-2 system and the number of packets intercepted is recorded.
To stress the system and provide a sufficiently small confidence interval, 400 packets
is selected. Prior to sending the 400 packets, five packets are sent to the system to
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“warm up” the board by caching the data and instructions used by the processor.
No additional network load is injected into the system. The network utilization is
measured using Wireshark.
For Experiment 3, a series of 300 packets, sent at 200 ms intervals, is sent from
the Backtrack laptop using the tcpreplay utility. Injecting the packets at 200 ms
intervals allows for the result of each trial (captured or not captured) to be inde-
pendent. The sample size of 300 packets produces a good binomial distribution with
small confidence intervals. For each of the three replications, a series of 300 packets
is sent into the TRAPP-2 system and the number of packets captured is recorded.
Prior to sending the 300 packets, five packets are sent to the system to “warm up” the
board by caching the data and instructions used by the processor. Additionally, prior
to injecting the 300 packets, the Linux pktgen utility is activated to add the various
network loads to the system. The network utilization is measured using variables
within the Linux pktgen utility. For Experiment 2 and Experiment 3, Wireshark is
used as the probability of packet intercept control.
3.10 Experimental Design
3.10.1 Experiment 1. Experiment 1 is a partial factorial design and calcu-
lates the packet processing time for 12 packet types and consists of 1800 trials (12
packet types x 50 packets x 3 replications). For packet processing time, a one-variable
t-test is used to determine the mean packet processing time in CPU cycles, the stan-
dard deviation, the standard error of the mean, and a 95% confidence interval for the
mean.
3.10.2 Experiment 2. Experiment 2 is a partial factorial design and calcu-
lates the probability of packet intercept for the four worst-case scenario packets: BT-
ON-WORST, SIP-INVITE-ON-LARGE-WORST, SIP-BYE-ON-LARGE-WORST, and
DNS-OFF-LARGE. Depending on the type of packet being investigated, the network
utilization consists of either all-BitTorrent, all-SIP, or all-DNS packets that are on the
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list. The test consists of 4800 trials (4 packet types x 400 packets x 3 replications).
For the probability of packet intercept, a one-proportion confidence interval analysis
is performed on the binomial variable to determine the probability of packet intercept
and a 95% confidence interval for the proportion.
3.10.3 Experiment 3. Experiment 3 is a partial factorial design and cal-
culates the probability of packet intercept for the same four worst-case scenario
packet types: BT-ON-WORST, SIP-INVITE-ON-LARGE-WORST, SIP-BYE-ON-
LARGE-WORST, and DNS-OFF-LARGE. However, the packets are injected into
the system at 200 ms intervals. Experiment 3 is performed under eight different non-
BitTorrent/SIP/DNS network utilizations, generated using the Linux pktgen utility,
and consists of 28,800 trials (4 packet types x 300 packets x 8 utilizations x 3 repli-
cations). For the probability of packet intercept, a one-proportion confidence interval
analysis is performed on the binomial variable to determine the probability of packet
intercept and a 95% confidence interval for the proportion.
3.10.4 Experiment 4. Experiment 4 is a partial factorial design and calcu-
lates the packet processing time for the DNS-OFF-LARGE packet. This packet is
used because it is the worst-case DNS packet. With the worst-case DNS packet, the
entire hash list must be searched. Experiment 4 consists of 2,550 trials (17 list sizes
x 1 packet type x 50 packets x 3 replications). For packet processing time, a one-
variable t-test is used to determine the mean packet processing time in CPU cycles,
the standard deviation, the standard error of the mean, and a 95% confidence interval
for the mean.
3.11 Methodology Summary
This section explains the experimental methods used to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the TRAPP-2 system under different workloads and network utilizations.
The performance is measured by calculating the packet processing time and the prob-
ability of packet intercept. Four partial factorial experiments are conducted with the
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TRAPP-2 system. Experiment 1 determines the packet processing times for pack-
ets of interest. Experiment 2 determines the probability of packet intercept under a
flood of 400 packets of interest. Experiment 3 determines the probability of packet
intercept under various network utilizations generated using the Linux pktgen utility.
Lastly, Experiment 4 determines how increasing the hash list size affects the packet
processing time.
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IV. Results and Analysis
This chapter presents the results and analysis of the four experiments. Section 4.1details the results and analysis from Experiment 1. Section 4.2 details the
results and analysis from Experiment 2. Section 4.3 details the results and analysis
from Experiment 3. Section 4.4 presents the results and analysis from Experiment
4. An overall analysis is provided in Section 4.5, and the chapter is summarized in
Section 4.6.
4.1 Results and Analysis of Experiment 1
Table 4.1 summarizes the results of a one-variable t-test using 12 different packet
types. The table contains the number of packets sent, mean number of CPU cycles
required to process the packet, the standard deviation, the standard error of the mean,
and the 95% confidence interval for the mean. The data is sorted based on the mean
CPU cycles (packet processing time).
Table 4.1: Sorted Mean Packet Processing Times for Experiment 1.
Packet Packets Mean Stand. Standard Confidence
Type Sent CPU Dev. Error of Interval
Cycles the Mean (95%)
DNS OFF SMALL 150 1671.83 53.33 4.35 (1663.22, 1680.43)
BT OFF 150 1973.00 0.00 0.00 (1973.00, 1973.00)
BT ON BEST 150 2085.72 52.03 4.25 (2077.33, 2094.11)
BT ON WORST 150 2217.39 50.83 4.15 (2209.19, 2225.59)
Non BT/SIP/DNS 150 4985.00 0.00 0.00 (4985.00, 4985.00)
DNS ON LARGE WORST 150 5172.00 0.00 0.00 (5172.00, 5172.00)
DNS OFF LARGE 150 5539.47 57.02 4.66 (5530.27, 5548.67)
SIP BYE ON SMALL BEST 150 8580.32 55.68 4.55 (8571.34, 8589.30)
SIP INV ON SMALL BEST 150 15283.0 545.8 44.6 (15195.0, 15371.1)
SIP BYE ON LARGE WORST 150 26071.6 655.6 53.5 (25965.9, 26177.4)
SIP INV OFF LARGE 150 31092.0 0.0 0.0 (31092.0, 31092.0)
SIP INV ON LARGE WORST 150 34226.6 879.8 71.8 (34084.6, 34368.5)
Figure 4.1 plots the sorted mean packet processing times for each of the 12
different packet types from Table 4.1. The range of mean packet processing time is
64
1,671.83 to 34,226.6 CPU cycles. DNS and BitTorrent packets tend to be on the lower
end, while all SIP packets are on the higher end of the range.
Figure 4.1: Mean Packet Processing Times for the 12 Different Packet Types for
Experiment 1.
4.1.1 BitTorrent Packet Processing Time. Table 4.2 highlights the BitTor-
rent packet processing time values from Experiment 1. Figure 4.2 plots the sorted
mean CPU cycles (packet processing time) and the 95% confidence intervals for the
BitTorrent packets. By using the worst- and best-case scenario BitTorrent packets, a
range of 2085.72 - 2,217.39 is established for all BitTorrent packets of interest.
Table 4.2: Sorted BitTorrent Mean Packet Processing Times for Experiment 1.
Packet Packets Mean Stand. Standard Confidence
Type Sent CPU Dev. Error of Interval
Cycles the Mean (95%)
BT OFF 150 1973.00 0.00 0.00 (1973.00, 1973.00)
BT ON BEST 150 2085.72 52.03 4.25 (2077.33, 2094.11)
BT ON WORST 150 2217.39 50.83 4.15 (2209.19, 2225.59)
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Figure 4.2: Mean Packet Processing Times for BitTorrent Packet Types for Exper-
iment 1.
4.1.2 SIP Packet Processing Time. Table 4.3 highlights the SIP packet
processing time values from Experiment 1. Figure 4.3 plots the sorted mean CPU
cycles (packet processing time) and 95% confidence intervals for the SIP packets. By
using the worst- and best-case scenario for SIP INVITE packets, a range of 15,283.0 -
34,226.6 is established for all SIP INVITE packets of interest. By using the worst- and
best-case scenario for SIP BYE packets, a range of 8,580.32 - 26,071.6 is established
for all SIP BYE packets of interest.
Table 4.3: Sorted Session Initiation Protocol Mean Packet Processing Times for
Experiment 1.
Packet Packets Mean Stand. Standard Confidence
Type Sent CPU Dev. Error of Interval
Cycles the Mean (95%)
SIP BYE ON SMALL BEST 150 8580.32 55.68 4.55 (8571.34, 8589.30)
SIP INV ON SMALL BEST 150 15283.0 545.8 44.6 (15195.0, 15371.1)
SIP BYE ON LARGE WORST 150 26071.6 655.6 53.5 (25965.9, 26177.4)
SIP INV OFF LARGE 150 31092.0 0.0 0.0 (31092.0, 31092.0)
SIP INV ON LARGE WORST 150 34226.6 879.8 71.8 (34084.6, 34368.5)
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Figure 4.3: Mean Packet Processing Times for Session Initiation Protocol Packet
Types for Experiment 1.
4.1.3 DNS Packet Processing Time. Table 4.4 highlights the DNS packet
processing time values from Experiment 1. Figure 4.4 plots the sorted mean CPU
cycles (packet processing time) and 95% confidence intervals for the DNS packets.
By using the worst- and best-case scenario for DNS packets, a range of 1,671.83 -
5,539.47 is established for all DNS packets of interest.
Table 4.4: Sorted Domain Name System Mean Packet Processing Times for Exper-
iment 1.
Packet Packets Mean Stand. Standard Confidence
Type Sent CPU Dev. Error of Interval
Cycles the Mean (95%)
DNS OFF SMALL 150 1671.83 53.33 4.35 (1663.22, 1680.43)
DNS ON LARGE WORST 150 5172.00 0.00 0.00 (5172.00, 5172.00)
DNS OFF LARGE 150 5539.47 57.02 4.66 (5530.27, 5548.67)
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Figure 4.4: Mean Packet Processing Times for Domain Name System Packet Types
for Experiment 1.
4.1.4 Experiment 1 Analysis. BitTorrent and DNS packets require the
least amount of packet processing time. This is due to the small byte size of the
packets. The packet size transfer pilot test, mentioned in Section 3.5.1.3, reveals that
transferring the packet from the Ethernet buffer to a software buffer takes significantly
longer for larger packets.
All five types of SIP packets require the most packet processing time. This
is due to the larger byte size and processing required of SIP packets compared to
BitTorrent and DNS. First, the TRAPP-2 system must copy the entire packet into a
software buffer, so the larger SIP packets take longer to transfer. Secondly, the SIP
packet payload must be searched for the To: and From: SIP URIs because they are
not at a fixed location in the payload. Furthermore, once the To: and From: SIP
URIs are extracted, they both must be separately sdbm hashed and searched against
the hash list.
68
SIP BYE packets have a smaller packet processing time than SIP INVITE pack-
ets when the other packet characteristics (on/off hash list, and hash location) are
equal. The disparity results because of the intrinsic larger packet size (approximately
375 bytes) of SIP INVITE packets over SIP BYE packets.
4.2 Results and Analysis of Experiment 2
Table 4.5 summarizes the results of flooding the TRAPP-2 system with 400
single protocol-of-interest packets. The protocol of interest is the worst-case scenario
packet for BitTorrent, SIP, and DNS. However, SIP INVITE and SIP BYE packets are
tested separately even though they fall under the same protocol. As a comparison,
the number of packets captured by Wireshark is also presented for each workload.
The table also contains the measured network utilization, the probability of packet
intercept, and the 95% confidence interval for the probability of packet intercept. The
data is sorted based on the network utilization measured using Wireshark.
Table 4.5: Probability of Packet Intercept for Flood of 1200 (400 packets x 3 repli-
cations) Worst-Case Scenario Packets for Experiment 2.
Workload Network Packets Packets Prob. of Confidence
Utilization% Captured Sent Packet Interval
(Events) (Trials) Intercept (95%)
BT (TRAPP-2) 15.46 1200 1200 1.0000 (0.9975, 1.0000)
BT (Wireshark) 15.46 1200 1200 1.0000 (0.9975, 1.0000)
DNS (TRAPP-2) 23.82 1039 1200 0.8658 (0.8452, 0.8846)
DNS (Wireshark) 23.82 1200 1200 1.0000 (0.9975, 1.0000)
SIP BYE (TRAPP-2) 94.75 264 1200 0.2200 (0.1969, 0.2445)
SIP BYE (Wireshark) 94.75 1200 1200 1.0000 (0.9975, 1.0000)
SIP INV (TRAPP-2) 99.48 239 1200 0.1992 (0.1769, 0.2229)
SIP INV (Wireshark) 99.48 1200 1200 1.0000 (0.9975, 1.0000)
Figure 4.5 plots the results from Table 4.5. For BitTorrent packets, both the
TRAPP-2 system and Wireshark intercept 100% of the 1200 packets (400 packets x
3 replications). However, the network utilization measured during the test is only
15.46%. This is due to BitTorrent relying on TCP, which uses reliable data transfer
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and exponential backoff mechanisms to throttle the throughput. For DNS packets,
the TRAPP-2 system captures 86.58% of the 1200 packets, while Wireshark captures
100%. The network utilization measured during the test is 23.82%. Although DNS
relies on UDP, allowing packets to be sent faster than TCP, the smaller size of the
packets results in a smaller network utilization. For SIP BYE packets, the TRAPP-2
system captures 22.00% of the 1200 packets while Wireshark captures 100% of the
packets. The network utilization measured during the test is 94.75%. The larger SIP
BYE packet byte size and reliance on UDP results in an increased network utilization.
For the final packet, SIP INVITE, the TRAPP-2 system captures 19.92% of the 1200
packets, while Wireshark again captures 100% of the packets. The 1500-byte SIP
packet transferred over UDP results in the highest network utilization of 99.48%.
Figure 4.5: Network Utilization and Probability of Packet Intercept vs Flood of 1200
packets (400 packets x 3 replications) Worst-Case Scenario Packets for Experiment 2.
4.2.1 Experiment 2 Analysis. Wireshark outperforms the TRAPP-2 system
in capturing a flood of 400 packets for DNS, SIP BYE, and SIP INVITE packet
types. This is due to the fact that Wireshark does not perform any processing on
the packets. As for the TRAPP-2 system, it must process 400 of the worst-case
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scenario packets back-to-back. The results are expected since DNS, SIP BYE, and
SIP INVITE packets require more CPU cycles to process than BitTorrent packets as
revealed in Experiment 1. Both the TRAPP-2 system and Wireshark capture 100%
of BitTorrent packets, however, the network utilization is only 15.46%. Although
Wireshark outperforms the TRAPP-2 system for three of the four packets, this type
of traffic is unrealistic in a real world network. For all four of these types of packets,
the same packet would not typically be sent back-to-back as fast as possible.
4.3 Results and Analysis of Experiment 3
4.3.1 BitTorrent Probability of Packet Intercept. Table 4.6 presents the
results for the BitTorrent packet under eight different network utilizations. As a
reminder, the network utilizations are generated by adding a load using the Linux
pktgen utility. The packet selected for the test is BT-ON-WORST, the worst-case
scenario BitTorrent packet. As a result of selecting the BT-ON-WORST packet, the
data in Table 4.6 is assumed to be the worst-case scenario for a BitTorrent packet
with a hash on a hash list size of 1000. The probability of packet intercept is the
percentage of 900 packets (300 packets x 3 replications) captured.
Table 4.6: Probability of Packet Intercept for BitTorrent Packets Under Various
Network Utilizations for Experiment 3.
Utilization % Prob. of Packet Confidence Prob. of Packet Confidence
Intercept Interval Intercept Interval
(TRAPP-2) (95%) (Wireshark) (95%)
20.4% 1.0000 (0.9967, 1.0000) 0.9589 (0.9437, 0.9708)
30.1% 0.9733 (0.9605, 0.9828) 0.7167 (0.6859, 0.7459)
40.8% 0.9667 (0.9527, 0.9773) 0.4122 (0.3798, 0.4451)
49.8% 0.9711 (0.9579, 0.9810) 0.3733 (0.3416, 0.4058)
60.2% 0.9578 (0.9425, 0.9699) 0.2556 (0.2273, 0.2853)
71.4% 0.9456 (0.9286, 0.9594) 0.2356 (0.2081, 0.2646)
81.8% 0.9578 (0.9425, 0.9699) 0.2089 (0.1827, 0.2369)
93.7% 0.9556 (0.9399, 0.9680) 0.1722 (0.1481, 0.1985)
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Figure 4.6 shows a plot of the probability of packet intercept for both the
TRAPP-2 system and Wireshark as the network utilization is increased. The TRAPP-
2 system has a higher probability of packet intercept for every network utilization
level. For the 20.4% network utilization, TRAPP-2 captures 100% of BitTorrent
packets and Wireshark captures 95.89%. Figure 4.6 reveals the approximate and
slight linear decrease in probability of packet intercept for the TRAPP-2 system, as
opposed to the exponential decrease by Wireshark, when the network utilization is
increased. This is further emphasized by the fact that the TRAPP-2 system man-
ages to capture 95.56% of BitTorrent packets at the maximum network utilization
of 93.7%. In contrast, Wireshark only captures 17.22% of BitTorrent packets at the
maximum network utilization.
Figure 4.6: Probability of Packet Intercept for BitTorrent Packets vs Various Net-
work Utilizations for Experiment 3.
4.3.2 SIP INVITE Probability of Packet Intercept. Table 4.7 presents the
results for the SIP INVITE packet under eight different network utilizations. The
packet selected for the test is SIP-INVITE-ON-LARGE-WORST, the worst-case sce-
nario SIP INVITE packet. As a result of selecting the SIP-INVITE-ON-LARGE-
WORST packet, the data in Table 4.7 is assumed to be the worst-case scenario for a
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SIP INVITE packet with a hash on a hash list size of 1000. The probability of packet
intercept is the percentage of 900 packets (300 packets x 3 replications) captured.
Table 4.7: Probability of Packet Intercept for Session Initiation Protocol INVITE
Packets Under Various Network Utilizations for Experiment 3.
Utilization % Prob. of Packet Confidence Prob. of Packet Confidence
Intercept Interval Intercept Interval
(TRAPP-2) (95%) (Wireshark) (95%)
20.4% 1.0000 (0.9967, 1.0000) 0.9600 (0.9450, 0.9718)
30.1% 0.4256 (0.3929, 0.4586) 0.6867 (0.6552, 0.7168)
40.8% 0.3144 (0.2842, 0.3459) 0.4467 (0.4138, 0.4798)
49.8% 0.2733 (0.2444, 0.3037) 0.3478 (0.3166, 0.3799)
60.2% 0.2778 (0.2487, 0.3082) 0.2589 (0.2305, 0.2888)
71.4% 0.2522 (0.2241, 0.2819) 0.2256 (0.1986, 0.2542)
81.8% 0.2322 (0.2049, 0.2612) 0.2200 (0.1933, 0.2485)
93.7% 0.2078 (0.1817, 0.2357) 0.1633 (0.1397, 0.1891)
Figure 4.7 shows a plot of the probability of packet intercept for both the
TRAPP-2 system and Wireshark as the network utilization is increased. For the 20.4%
network utilization, TRAPP-2 captures 100% of SIP INVITE packets and Wireshark
captures 96.00%. The TRAPP-2 system has a higher probability of packet intercept
for the 20.4% network utilization, drops below Wireshark in the 30.1% - 49.8% range,
then exceeds Wireshark for the remaining network utilizations. Figure 4.7 reveals
the approximate exponential decrease in probability of packet intercept for both the
TRAPP-2 system and Wireshark when the network utilization is increased.
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Figure 4.7: Probability of Packet Intercept for Session Initiation Protocol INVITE
Packets vs Various Network Utilizations for Experiment 3.
4.3.3 SIP BYE Probability of Packet Intercept. Table 4.8 presents the
results for the SIP BYE packet under eight different network utilizations. The packet
selected for the test is SIP-BYE-ON-LARGE-WORST, the worst-case scenario SIP
BYE packet. As a result of selecting the SIP-BYE-ON-LARGE-WORST packet, the
data in Table 4.8 is assumed to be the worst-case scenario for a SIP BYE packet
with a hash on a hash list size of 1000. The probability of packet intercept is the
percentage of 900 packets (300 packets x 3 replications) captured.
Table 4.8: Probability of Packet Intercept for Session Initiation Protocol BYE
Packets Under Various Network Utilizations for Experiment 3.
Utilization % Prob. of Packet Confidence Prob. of Packet Confidence
Intercept Interval Intercept Interval
(TRAPP-2) (95%) (Wireshark) (95%)
20.4% 1.0000 (0.9967, 1.0000) 0.9633 (0.9488, 0.9746)
30.1% 0.6344 (0.6020, 0.6659) 0.6778 (0.6461, 0.7082)
40.8% 0.5189 (0.4856, 0.5519) 0.4200 (0.3875, 0.4530)
49.8% 0.4600 (0.4270, 0.4932) 0.3078 (0.2777, 0.3390)
60.2% 0.5167 (0.4834, 0.5497) 0.3111 (0.2809, 0.3424)
71.4% 0.4711 (0.4380, 0.5043) 0.2556 (0.2273, 0.2853)
81.8% 0.4544 (0.4215, 0.4876) 0.1989 (0.1732, 0.2264)
93.7% 0.3711 (0.3394, 0.4036) 0.1589 (0.1355, 0.1844)
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Figure 4.8 shows a plot of the probability of packet intercept for both the
TRAPP-2 system and Wireshark as the network utilization is increased. For the
20.4% network utilization, TRAPP-2 captures 100% of SIP BYE packets and Wire-
shark captures 96.33%. The TRAPP-2 system has a higher probability of packet inter-
cept for the 20.4% network utilization, drops below Wireshark at 30.1%, then exceeds
Wireshark for the remaining network utilizations. Figure 4.8 reveals the approximate
exponential decrease in probability of packet intercept for both the TRAPP-2 system
and Wireshark when the network utilization is increased. For both the TRAPP-2
system and Wireshark, a small bump in the probability of packet intercept is visible
at the 60.2% network utilization. The reason for the bump appearing in both the
TRAPP-2 system and Wireshark results is unknown.
Figure 4.8: Probability of Packet Intercept for Session Initiation Protocol BYE
Packets vs Various Network Utilizations for Experiment 3.
4.3.4 DNS Probability of Packet Intercept. Table 4.9 presents the results
for the DNS packet under eight different network utilizations. The packet selected
for the test is DNS-OFF-LARGE, the worst-case scenario DNS packet. As a result
of selecting the DNS-OFF-LARGE packet, the data in Table 4.9 is assumed to be
the worst-case scenario for a DNS packet with a hash off a hash list size of 1000.
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The probability of packet intercept is the percentage of 900 packets (300 packets x 3
replications) captured.
Table 4.9: Probability of Packet Intercept for Domain Name System Packets Under
Various Network Utilizations for Experiment 3.
Utilization % Prob. of Packet Confidence Prob. of Packet Confidence
Intercept Interval Intercept Interval
(TRAPP-2) (95%) (Wireshark) (95%)
20.4% 1.0000 (0.9967, 1.0000) 0.9567 (0.9412, 0.9690)
30.1% 0.9789 (0.9672, 0.9872) 0.6544 (0.6223, 0.6855)
40.8% 0.9644 (0.9501, 0.9755) 0.4500 (0.4171, 0.4831)
49.8% 0.9611 (0.9463, 0.9727) 0.3556 (0.3242, 0.3878)
60.2% 0.9100 (0.8893, 0.9278) 0.3144 (0.2842, 0.3459)
71.4% 0.9200 (0.9003, 0.9368) 0.2289 (0.2018, 0.2577)
81.8% 0.8911 (0.8689, 0.9107) 0.2500 (0.2220, 0.2796)
93.7% 0.9189 (0.8990, 0.9358) 0.1800 (0.1554, 0.2066)
Figure 4.9 shows a plot of the probability of packet intercept for both the
TRAPP-2 system and Wireshark as the network utilization is increased. The TRAPP-
2 system has a higher probability of packet intercept for every network utilization level.
For the 20.4% network utilization, TRAPP-2 captures 100% of SIP BYE packets and
Wireshark captures 95.67%. Figure 4.9 reveals the approximate and slight linear de-
crease in probability of packet intercept for the TRAPP-2 system, as opposed to the
exponential decrease by Wireshark, when the network utilization is increased. This is
further emphasized by the fact that the TRAPP-2 system manages to capture 91.89%
of DNS packets at the maximum network utilization of 93.7%. In contrast, Wireshark
only captures 18.00% of DNS packets at the maximum network utilization.
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Figure 4.9: Probability of Packet Intercept for Domain Name System Packets vs
Various Network Utilizations for Experiment 3.
4.3.5 Experiment 3 Analysis. The TRAPP-2 system significantly outper-
forms Wireshark in capturing BitTorrent and DNS packets. The TRAPP-2 system
captures 95.56% of BitTorrent and 91.89% of DNS packets under a 93.7% network
utilization. Wireshark captures 17.22% of BitTorrent and 18.00% of DNS packets
under the same 93.7% network utilization. As a reminder, the packets selected for
this test are the worst-case scenario packets.
The TRAPP-2 system and Wireshark return similar performances for SIP IN-
VITE packets. However, the TRAPP-2 system captures 20.78% of packets compared
to Wireshark’s 16.33% under a 93.7% network utilization. The TRAPP-2 system and
Wireshark return similar performances for SIP BYE packets at the 20.4% and 30.1%
network utilization. After that, the TRAPP-2 system outperforms Wireshark. Un-
der a 93.7% network utilization, the TRAPP-2 system captures 37.11% of SIP BYE
packets compared to 15.89% by Wireshark. The TRAPP-2 system has a smaller prob-
ability of packet intercept for SIP INVITE and SIP BYE packets due to the larger
packet size and packet processing time.
In general, the probability of packet intercept for Wireshark, regardless of packet
type, follows the same exponential decrease as the network utilization is increased.
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The probability of packet intercept for the TRAPP-2 system depends on the type of
packet being captured. For the TRAPP-2 system, the smaller BitTorrent and DNS
packets outperform the larger SIP INVITE and SIP BYE packets at higher network
utilizations.
4.4 Results and Analysis of Experiment 4
Table 4.10 summarizes the results of a one-variable t-test using 17 different hash
list sizes. The packet selected for this test is the DNS-OFF-LARGE, the worst-case
scenario DNS packet. The packet is selected because the entire hash list search is
exhausted. The table contains the number of packets sent, mean number of CPU
cycles required to process the DNS packet, the standard deviation, the standard error
of the mean, and the 95% confidence interval for the mean.
Table 4.10: Mean Packet Processing Times for 17 Different Hash List Sizes for
Experiment 4.
Hash List Packets Mean Standard Standard Error Confidence
Items Sent CPU Cycles Deviation of the Mean Interval (95%)
2,000 150 5683.87 66.14 5.40 (5673.19, 5694.54)
4,000 150 5697.71 60.08 4.91 (5688.01, 5707.40)
8,000 150 5707.06 56.62 4.62 (5697.93, 5716.19)
16,000 150 5723.72 55.12 4.50 (5714.83, 5732.61)
32,000 150 5739.69 52.16 4.26 (5731.27, 5748.10)
64,000 150 5756.57 60.68 4.95 (5746.78, 5766.36)
128,000 150 5780.12 55.10 4.50 (5771.23, 5789.01)
256,000 150 5799.23 60.81 4.97 (5789.42, 5809.04)
512,000 150 5814.21 66.36 5.42 (5803.50, 5824.91)
1,024,000 150 5830.26 77.46 6.32 (5817.76, 5842.76)
2,048,000 150 5848.29 70.11 5.72 (5836.98, 5859.61)
4,096,000 150 5867.69 73.64 6.01 (5855.81, 5879.57)
8,192,000 150 5886.57 80.20 6.55 (5873.63, 5899.51)
16,384,000 150 5901.64 81.78 6.68 (5888.45, 5914.83)
32,768,000 150 5918.90 84.62 6.91 (5905.25, 5932.55)
65,536,000 150 5931.99 52.17 4.26 (5923.58, 5940.41)
131,072,000 150 5938.81 39.85 3.25 (5932.38, 5945.24)
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Figure 4.10 shows a plot of the mean packet processing time as the hash list
size is increased. The smallest hash list size is 2,000 and is doubled up to 131,072,000
unique hash items on the hash list. The doubling of the hash list size results in
a logarithmic plot for the mean packet processing times. Note that the difference
between mean packet processing times for the hash list size of 2,000 and 131,072,000
is approximately only 255 CPU cycles.
Figure 4.10: Mean Packet Processing Times vs 17 Different Hash List Sizes for
Experiment 4.
To verify the logarithmic nature of the mean packet processing times as the hash
list size is doubled, a separate plot is required. Figure 4.11 plots the mean packet
processing times against the natural log of the hash list sizes. The linearity of the
plot asserts the logarithmic nature of doubling the hash list size.
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Figure 4.11: Mean Packet Processing Times vs Natural Log of 17 Different Hash
List Sizes for Experiment 4.
Table 4.11 displays the mean packet processing times and the difference between
them. For example, the hash list size of 4,000 takes an average of 13.84 more CPU
cycles than the hash list size of 2,000. The range is from 6.22 - 23.55 CPU cycles and
the overall average difference between the means is 15.93 CPU cycles. This results
in the average addition of 15.93 CPU cycles to the overall packet processing time for
each doubling of the hash list size.
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Table 4.11: Difference Between Mean Packet Processing Times for 17 Different
Hash List Sizes for Experiment 4.
Hash List Mean Difference
Items CPU Cycles Between Means
2,000 5683.87 -
4,000 5697.71 13.84
8,000 5707.06 9.35
16,000 5723.72 16.66
32,000 5739.69 15.97
64,000 5756.57 16.88
128,000 5780.12 23.55
256,000 5799.23 19.11
512,000 5814.21 14.98
1,024,000 5830.26 16.05
2,048,000 5848.29 18.03
4,096,000 5867.69 19.40
8,192,000 5886.57 18.88
16,384,000 5901.64 15.07
32,768,000 5918.90 17.26
65,536,000 5931.99 13.09
131,072,000 5938.81 6.82
Average Difference 15.93
Between Means
4.4.1 Experiment 4 Analysis. Doubling the hash list size results in an
average mean increase of 15.93 CPU cycles for the DNS packet. The four-byte sdbm
hash contains eight hexadecimal values, e.g., 1F7B032A. Thus, there are a total of
4,294,967,296 (168) unique hashes for a four-byte hash. The maximum hash list
size of 131,072,000 unique items for the TRAPP-2 system equates to 3.05% of the
total number of hashes due to the 512 MB memory limit. If a system of 4,294,967,296
unique hashes is desired, then 16 GB of storage is required. The number 4,294,967,296
can be achieved by doubling the max list size of 131,072,000 approximately five more
times. With a mean of approximately 16 additional CPU cycles per doubling of the
hashlist, 4,294,967,296 unique hash items can be searched in additional 5 x 16 =
80 CPU cycles. This assumes the hash list is sorted to cater to the binary search
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algorithm. These results are encouraging for future research that will rely on larger
hash list sizes.
4.5 Overall Analysis
The results from Experiment 1 assist in understanding the results of Experi-
ment 3. The smaller packet processing times for BitTorrent and DNS packets allows
the TRAPP-2 system to capture them with a probability of packet intercept greater
than 90% under the maximum network utilization of 93.7%. Both the SIP INVITE
and SIP BYE packets take longer to process and, as result, are captured at a signifi-
cantly lower probability of packet intercept under the same 93.7% network utilization.
As a reminder, the worst-case scenario packets are selected for Experiment 3 so the
probabililty of packet intercept represents the minimum probablibilty of packet inter-
cept. Higher probabilities of packet intercept can be achieved with packets that have
more favorable packet characteristics. Overall, the probability of packet intercept for
Wireshark is markedly lower than the TRAPP-2 system under the various network
utilizations of Experiment 3. The default buffer size for Wireshark, which is used for
this research, is 1 MB. This is significantly greater than the 32 KB First-In-First-Out
buffer used in conjunction with the FPGA’s Ethernet controller. Perhaps increasing
the buffer size in Wireshark can produce more favorable results, but the fact still
remains that the TRAPP-2 system’s buffer is smaller and outperforms Wireshark.
Experiment 2 reveals that Wireshark outperforms the TRAPP-2 system when
there is no additional network utilization added and 400 packets flood the system. It
appears Wireshark is capable of handling a small flood of packets of interest more
efficiently than the TRAPP-2 system. This is likely due to the large 1 MB buffer and
lack of packet processing required by Wireshark.
The results from Experiment 4 reveal that doubling the hash list size increases
the packet processing time only slightly (an average of 0.27%). Although the worst-
case scenario DNS packet is selected for the test, the experiment essentially measures
the speed of the binary search algorithm and is independent of the type of packet hash
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being processed. Therefore, the results can be extended and expected of BitTorrent
and SIP packet hashes as well. The binary search algorithm is chosen for simplicity.
Implementing other data structures and algorithms could result in faster hash lookups.
4.6 Summary
This chapter presents the results and analysis from the four experiments mea-
suring packet processing time and probability of packet intercept. Statistical analysis
of the data’s packet processing time and probability of packet intercept is performed.
An overall analysis and discussion is presented at the end. The most relevant re-
sults show that the TRAPP-2 system captures 95.56% of BitTorrent, 20.78% of SIP
INVITE, 37.11% of SIP BYE, and 91.89% of DNS worst-case scenario packets of in-
terest while under a 93.7% network utilization. Additionally, Experiment 4 reveals
that each doubling of the hash list size results in a mean increase of approximately
16 CPU cycles.
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V. Conclusions
This chapter summarizes the overall goals and conclusions of the research. Sec-tion 5.1 summarizes the results and whether the goals and hypotheses are met.
The significance of the research is presented in Section 5.2. Lastly, Section 5.3 provides
recommendations to expand and progress the research of the TRAPP-2 system.
5.1 Conclusions of Research
5.1.1 Goal #1: Determine the packet processing times for packets of interest.
The first goal is to determine the packet processing times for packets of interest. The
TRAPP-2 system must be able to process packets as quickly as possible. Experiment
1 reveals BitTorrent and DNS packets require the fewest CPU cycles and both types of
SIP packets require the most. The TRAPP-2 system can process all types of packets
under 35,000 CPU cycles, thus meeting the goal and proving the hypothesis.
5.1.2 Goal #2: Determine the probability of packet intercept under a flood of
400 packets of interest. The second goal of this research is to determine the prob-
ability of packet intercept for a flood of 400 packets of interest. Experiment 2 reveals
that the TRAPP-2 system captures 100% of BitTorrent, 86.58% of DNS, 22.00% of
SIP BYE, and 19.92% of SIP INVITE packets when 400 packets are sent as fast as
possible, thus meeting the research goal. However, the measured network utilizations
vary significantly depending on the type of packet being sent. The TRAPP-2 system
fails to capture over 50% of the SIP BYE and SIP INVITE packets, thus failing to
meet the hypothesis. This type of traffic is unrealistic and is simply meant to stress
the TRAPP-2 system.
5.1.3 Goal #3: Determine the probability of packet intercept under various
network utilizations. The third goal of this research is to determine the probability
of packet intercept for packets of interest under various network utilizations. Experi-
ment 3 reveals that the TRAPP-2 system captures, with 95% confidence, 95.56% of
BitTorrent, 20.78% of SIP INVITE, 37.11% of SIP BYE, and 91.89% of DNS packets
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of interest under a 93.7% network utilization. The packets selected for the experi-
ment are the worst-case scenario, so the reported probability of packet intercept is
the minimum. The 93.7% network utilization is equal to 937 megabits per second.
These results exceed the hypothesized values and meet the research goal.
5.1.4 Goal #4: Determine how the hash list size affects packet processing time.
The fourth goal of this research is to determine how increasing the hash list size
affects the packet processing time. The original hash list size of 1,000 unique items is
doubled 17 times to generate a hash list with 131,072,000 unique items. Experiment 4
reveals how each doubling of the hash list exposes the logarithmic nature of the packet
processing time versus the number of hash list items. The mean packet processing
time increases an average of 15.93 CPU cycles per doubling of the hash list size. This
value is less than the hypothesized value of 50, thus meeting the goal and proving the
hypothesis.
5.2 Significance of Research
This research allows the military and government agencies to detect and track
malicious BitTorrent, SIP, and DNS traffic traversing networks at gigabit speeds using
large hash lists. The experiments selected measure the packet processing time and
probability of packet intercept for the TRAPP-2 system under various conditions. The
results and analysis conclude that the TRAPP-2 system is capable of detecting and
tracking traffic of interest on a gigabit Ethernet network. This research also reveals
how increasing the hash list size affects the packet processing time for DNS packets.
Although DNS is the only protocol tested, the results apply equally to BitTorrent file
hashes and SIP URI domains. This allows for larger lists of known illegal BitTorrent
file hashes or SIP URIs of interest to be used on the TRAPP-2 system.
The TRAPP-2 system is attractive to network administrators because it is a
passive solution. The FPGA design allows for quick implementation onto a local area
network, assuming there is a gateway switch with a SPAN port. In addition, if the
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TRAPP-2 system fails, it cannot disrupt or interfere with network traffic because it
is not installed in-line with other network appliances.
For BitTorrent traffic, the TRAPP-2 system aids law enforcement in the fight
against illegal file distribution. TRAPP-2 can identify the parties participating in an
illegal file transfer. The TRAPP-2 system can also be used to identify the accidental or
intentional disclosure of sensitive documents from military and government networks
through BitTorrent file sharing programs. The system provides proof in the form of
the logged packet which contains the hash of the file being transmitted and the IP
addresses of the computers participating.
The proliferation of Internet phones and VoIP has made tracking persons of
interest difficult. The TRAPP-2 system aids law enforcement and intelligence agencies
in identifying social networks and cells of criminals, terrorists, and other people of
interest using VoIP technologies. By detecting SIP URI domains of interest, maps of
players and organizational hierarchies can be derived to aid investigators.
Lastly, the TRAPP-2 system aids network administrators in detecting poten-
tial data exfiltration via malicious DNS traffic. By establishing a DNS whitelist of
approved domains, network administrators can use the TRAPP-2 system to identify
potential abuses of DNS. The TRAPP-2 system logs the packet, and more impor-
tantly, the IP addresses of the computers communicating. This can help investigators
in identifying compromised computers and the external IP addresses establishing the
unauthorized communication channels.
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research
The first suggestion for future research is to expand the hardware capabilities of
the ML510 FPGA. The board contains an additional PowerPC processor and gigabit
Ethernet controller that are not used in this research. Additional processing, func-
tions, and algorithm work can be offloaded to the second processor. Additionally, the
second processor can be used to hash the SIP URIs and DNS domains using a better
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hashing algorithm than sdbm. The second gigabit Ethernet controller can be used as
a backup or out-of-band administrative Ethernet controller.
Secondly, future research can focus on using a proven hashing algorithm such
as SHA-1 or the Message-Digest algorithm 5 (MD5). For this research, the sdbm
hashing algorithm is selected because of its speed and simplicity. Shortfalls such as a
minimal avalanche effect and potential collisions are not considered. The algorithm
processing can reside on a separate dedicated processor as mentioned above.
BitTorrent, SIP, and DNS are not the only protocols that can be abused or
have malicious intent. Another suggestion is to investigate the Internet Relay Chat
protocol used for botnet command and control. The Hypertext Transfer Protocol is
another popular tunneling protocol because of its reliance on TCP port 80, which is
open in most organizations. The TRAPP-2 system can easily be adapted to other
protocols that can be abused by modifying the signature detection logic.
Lastly, detecting encrypted and obfuscated network traffic is another area of
future research. This research assumes that the BitTorrent, SIP, and DNS traffic is
not encrypted or obfuscated. Research efforts can focus on decrypting traffic on the
fly, perhaps using the other processor to accomplish this, while still maintaining the
system’s speed.
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Appendix A. Experimental Data
This Appendix contains the raw data collected for the experiments. Section A.1contains the data from Experiment 1. Section A.2 contains the data from
Experiment 2. Section A.3 contains the data from Experiment 3. Section A.4 contains
the data from Experiment 4.
A.1 Results of Experiment 1
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Table A.1: CPU Cycle Data for Experiment 1.
Non BT/SIP/DNS BT ON WORST BT ON BEST BT OFF
Packet Rep. 1 Rep 2 Rep 3 Rep. 1 Rep 2 Rep 3 Rep. 1 Rep 2 Rep 3 Rep. 1 Rep 2 Rep 3
1 4985 4985 4985 2305 2205 2181 2213 2051 2049 1973 1973 1973
2 4985 4985 4985 2184 2185 2181 2052 2053 2049 1973 1973 1973
3 4985 4985 4985 2307 2321 2181 2175 2153 2049 1973 1973 1973
4 4985 4985 4985 2275 2184 2181 2143 2052 2049 1973 1973 1973
5 4985 4985 4985 2185 2279 2181 2053 2147 2049 1973 1973 1973
6 4985 4985 4985 2275 2303 2181 2143 2171 2049 1973 1973 1973
7 4985 4985 4985 2183 2185 2181 2051 2053 2049 1973 1973 1973
8 4985 4985 4985 2185 2275 2181 2053 2143 2049 1973 1973 1973
9 4985 4985 4985 2285 2183 2181 2153 2051 2049 1973 1973 1973
10 4985 4985 4985 2184 2185 2181 2052 2053 2049 1973 1973 1973
11 4985 4985 4985 2287 2285 2181 2155 2153 2049 1973 1973 1973
12 4985 4985 4985 2275 2184 2181 2143 2052 2049 1973 1973 1973
13 4985 4985 4985 2185 2287 2181 2053 2155 2049 1973 1973 1973
14 4985 4985 4985 2275 2303 2181 2143 2187 2049 1973 1973 1973
15 4985 4985 4985 2183 2185 2181 2051 2053 2049 1973 1973 1973
16 4985 4985 4985 2185 2303 2181 2053 2171 2049 1973 1973 1973
17 4985 4985 4985 2285 2183 2181 2153 2051 2049 1973 1973 1973
18 4985 4985 4985 2184 2185 2181 2052 2053 2049 1973 1973 1973
19 4985 4985 4985 2279 2305 2181 2147 2173 2049 1973 1973 1973
20 4985 4985 4985 2303 2184 2181 2171 2052 2049 1973 1973 1973
21 4985 4985 4985 2185 2307 2181 2053 2175 2049 1973 1973 1973
22 4985 4985 4985 2283 2303 2181 2151 2171 2049 1973 1973 1973
23 4985 4985 4985 2183 2185 2181 2051 2053 2049 1973 1973 1973
24 4985 4985 4985 2185 2267 2181 2053 2135 2049 1973 1973 1973
25 4985 4985 4985 2285 2183 2181 2153 2051 2049 1973 1973 1973
26 4985 4985 4985 2184 2185 2181 2052 2053 2049 1973 1973 1973
27 4985 4985 4985 2307 2277 2181 2175 2145 2049 1973 1973 1973
28 4985 4985 4985 2303 2184 2181 2171 2052 2049 1973 1973 1973
29 4985 4985 4985 2185 2271 2181 2053 2139 2049 1973 1973 1973
30 4985 4985 4985 2303 2255 2181 2171 2123 2049 1973 1973 1973
31 4985 4985 4985 2183 2185 2181 2051 2053 2049 1973 1973 1973
32 4985 4985 4985 2185 2295 2181 2053 2163 2049 1973 1973 1973
33 4985 4985 4985 2277 2183 2181 2209 2051 2049 1973 1973 1973
34 4985 4985 4985 2184 2185 2181 2052 2053 2049 1973 1973 1973
35 4985 4985 4985 2307 2337 2181 2175 2137 2049 1973 1973 1973
36 4985 4985 4985 2295 2184 2181 2151 2052 2049 1973 1973 1973
37 4985 4985 4985 2185 2271 2181 2053 2139 2049 1973 1973 1973
38 4985 4985 4985 2275 2267 2181 2143 2135 2049 1973 1973 1973
39 4985 4985 4985 2183 2185 2181 2051 2053 2049 1973 1973 1973
40 4985 4985 4985 2185 2283 2181 2053 2219 2049 1973 1973 1973
41 4985 4985 4985 2277 2183 2181 2145 2051 2049 1973 1973 1973
42 4985 4985 4985 2184 2185 2181 2052 2053 2049 1973 1973 1973
43 4985 4985 4985 2307 2232 2181 2175 2100 2049 1973 1973 1973
44 4985 4985 4985 2303 2184 2181 2171 2052 2049 1973 1973 1973
45 4985 4985 4985 2185 2287 2181 2053 2155 2049 1973 1973 1973
46 4985 4985 4985 2283 2283 2181 2151 2151 2049 1973 1973 1973
47 4985 4985 4985 2183 2185 2181 2051 2053 2049 1973 1973 1973
48 4985 4985 4985 2185 2283 2181 2053 2151 2049 1973 1973 1973
49 4985 4985 4985 2305 2183 2181 2173 2051 2049 1973 1973 1973
50 4985 4985 4985 2184 2185 2181 2052 2053 2049 1973 1973 1973
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Table A.2: CPU Cycle Data for Experiment 1 Continued.
SIP INV ON LARGE WORST SIP INV ON SMALL BEST SIP INV OFF LARGE SIP BYE ON LARGE WORST
Rep. 1 Rep 2 Rep 3 Rep. 1 Rep 2 Rep 3 Rep. 1 Rep 2 Rep 3 Rep. 1 Rep 2 Rep 3
33240 32776 32802 14823 14735 14761 31092 31092 31092 25615 25347 25388
33191 32809 32815 14929 14815 14797 31092 31092 31092 25448 25374 25347
33257 32896 32872 14769 14822 14812 31092 31092 31092 25579 25347 25347
33341 32779 32800 14859 14769 14734 31092 31092 31092 25496 25347 25388
33071 32856 32830 14863 14783 14804 31092 31092 31092 25529 25347 25347
33292 32857 32863 14757 14758 14776 31092 31092 31092 25553 25370 25388
33041 32780 32820 14970 14774 14774 31092 31092 31092 25545 25347 25383
33034 32847 32856 14848 14782 14806 31092 31092 31092 25613 25380 25347
32938 32832 32812 14734 14761 14755 31092 31092 31092 25629 25347 25392
33046 32805 32801 14825 14807 14786 31092 31092 31092 25553 25380 25376
33620 32825 32858 14858 14783 14822 31092 31092 31092 25629 25376 25347
33527 32800 32779 14857 14734 14769 31092 31092 31092 25649 25384 25376
34028 32862 32862 14857 14820 14824 31092 31092 31092 25448 25347 25388
34629 32907 32897 14838 14761 14734 31092 31092 31092 25468 25374 25368
34350 32816 32812 14836 14760 14766 31092 31092 31092 25496 25368 25347
35319 35268 35304 14768 14816 14808 31092 31092 31092 25462 25370 25380
36279 36194 36194 14770 14735 14735 31092 31092 31092 25615 25376 25396
34572 34571 34597 14805 14851 14867 31092 31092 31092 25735 25374 25347
34632 34647 34665 14797 14808 14822 31092 31092 31092 25735 25368 25384
34646 34596 34572 14867 14734 14734 31092 31092 31092 25551 25347 25347
34624 34632 34634 15022 14810 14783 31092 31092 31092 26238 25384 25388
34537 34706 34666 14928 14734 14775 31092 31092 31092 26540 25347 25388
34590 34600 34596 14862 14734 14734 31092 31092 31092 26528 25368 25384
34597 34655 34627 15103 14782 14802 31092 31092 31092 26276 25347 25347
34647 34590 34522 15726 14771 14735 31092 31092 31092 26935 26311 26307
34596 34567 34597 15882 14823 14819 31092 31092 31092 28288 28600 28534
34658 34641 34641 15662 14835 14835 31092 31092 31092 26566 26508 26534
34574 34534 34490 15735 14769 14734 31092 31092 31092 26566 26510 26508
34438 34620 34618 15181 16279 16155 31092 31092 31092 26608 26566 26540
34653 34670 34696 17071 16833 16879 31092 31092 31092 26582 26550 26508
34594 34596 34596 15828 15752 15726 31092 31092 31092 26558 26576 26576
34597 34601 34627 15803 15828 15832 31092 31092 31092 26568 26576 26510
34605 34390 34390 15726 15728 15728 31092 31092 31092 26546 26602 26566
34582 34597 34597 15804 15831 15873 31092 31092 31092 26540 26604 26534
34510 34397 34365 15688 15799 15799 31092 31092 31092 26540 26576 26470
35495 35555 35679 15831 15753 15729 31092 31092 31092 26580 26508 26600
34452 35158 35202 15847 15812 15840 31092 31092 31092 26542 26508 26552
35971 35872 35890 15753 15753 15727 31092 31092 31092 26566 26552 26508
34590 34596 34596 15828 15752 15726 31092 31092 31092 26500 26534 26508
34597 34627 34603 15727 15802 15830 31092 31092 31092 26608 26508 26566
34665 34590 34594 15752 15752 15726 31092 31092 31092 26590 26534 26534
34596 34597 34597 15802 15831 15805 31092 31092 31092 26542 26550 26508
34632 34665 34639 15688 15799 15835 31092 31092 31092 26502 26508 26550
34670 34610 34596 15831 15727 15727 31092 31092 31092 26526 26536 26534
34532 34620 34632 15825 15844 15802 31092 31092 31092 26618 26550 26508
34627 34676 34670 15753 15759 15769 31092 31092 31092 26634 26444 26486
34566 34598 34600 15828 15726 15760 31092 31092 31092 26608 26508 26508
34507 34563 34495 15727 15828 15828 31092 31092 31092 26560 26508 26534
34649 34642 34664 15728 15726 15752 31092 31092 31092 26478 26602 26508
34572 34597 34597 15738 15807 15807 31092 31092 31092 26636 26594 26508
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Table A.3: CPU Cycle Data for Experiment 1 Continued.
SIP BYE ON SMALL BEST DNS ON LARGE WORST DNS OFF SMALL DNS OFF LARGE
Rep. 1 Rep 2 Rep 3 Rep. 1 Rep 2 Rep 3 Rep. 1 Rep 2 Rep 3 Rep. 1 Rep 2 Rep 3
8522 8623 8623 5172 5172 5172 1635 1635 1635 5504 5566 5492
8624 8522 8522 5172 5172 5172 1757 1757 1635 5606 5604 5492
8528 8658 8662 5172 5172 5172 1635 1761 1635 5504 5690 5492
8638 8522 8522 5172 5172 5172 1729 1635 1635 5626 5560 5492
8522 8623 8623 5172 5172 5172 1733 1759 1635 5504 5582 5492
8644 8522 8522 5172 5172 5172 1635 1635 1635 5626 5560 5492
8544 8623 8658 5172 5172 5172 1759 1635 1635 5504 5698 5492
8644 8522 8522 5172 5172 5172 1635 1729 1635 5598 5504 5492
8522 8623 8623 5172 5172 5172 1635 1635 1635 5504 5582 5492
8616 8522 8522 5172 5172 5172 1757 1729 1635 5626 5504 5492
8560 8623 8623 5172 5172 5172 1635 1761 1635 5504 5582 5492
8624 8522 8522 5172 5172 5172 1729 1635 1635 5598 5504 5492
8546 8623 8658 5172 5172 5172 1741 1739 1635 5504 5582 5492
8644 8522 8522 5172 5172 5172 1635 1635 1635 5626 5504 5492
8522 8623 8623 5172 5172 5172 1823 1635 1635 5504 5582 5492
8644 8522 8522 5172 5172 5172 1635 1729 1635 5626 5556 5492
8522 8623 8648 5172 5172 5172 1635 1635 1635 5504 5582 5492
8616 8556 8522 5172 5172 5172 1737 1757 1635 5598 5560 5492
8522 8623 8623 5172 5172 5172 1635 1733 1635 5504 5582 5492
8616 8522 8522 5172 5172 5172 1737 1635 1635 5626 5571 5492
8522 8623 8623 5172 5172 5172 1761 1731 1635 5504 5606 5492
8616 8522 8544 5172 5172 5172 1635 1635 1635 5626 5609 5492
8522 8623 8623 5172 5172 5172 1759 1635 1635 5504 5778 5492
8664 8522 8538 5172 5172 5172 1635 1757 1635 5658 5504 5492
8546 8623 8644 5172 5172 5172 1635 1635 1635 5504 5663 5492
8632 8522 8522 5172 5172 5172 1729 1729 1635 5626 5504 5492
8522 8678 8639 5172 5172 5172 1635 1741 1635 5504 5582 5492
8660 8522 8562 5172 5172 5172 1757 1635 1635 5598 5608 5492
8522 8623 8623 5172 5172 5172 1733 1739 1635 5504 5582 5492
8644 8522 8522 5172 5172 5172 1635 1635 1635 5598 5504 5492
8522 8650 8650 5172 5172 5172 1731 1635 1635 5504 5582 5492
8644 8522 8552 5172 5172 5172 1635 1757 1635 5598 5504 5492
8522 8650 8623 5172 5172 5172 1635 1635 1635 5504 5582 5492
8616 8522 8522 5172 5172 5172 1737 1729 1635 5626 5504 5492
8522 8623 8623 5172 5172 5172 1635 1733 1635 5504 5582 5492
8652 8522 8522 5172 5172 5172 1757 1635 1635 5606 5504 5492
8522 8623 8623 5172 5172 5172 1733 1739 1635 5504 5582 5492
8644 8522 8562 5172 5172 5172 1635 1635 1635 5598 5504 5492
8522 8623 8623 5172 5172 5172 1731 1635 1635 5504 5582 5492
8608 8522 8548 5172 5172 5172 1635 1729 1635 5626 5504 5492
8522 8656 8648 5172 5172 5172 1635 1635 1635 5533 5582 5492
8624 8522 8522 5172 5172 5172 1737 1737 1635 5598 5504 5492
8522 8662 8623 5172 5172 5172 1635 1733 1635 5504 5582 5492
8624 8522 8522 5172 5172 5172 1757 1635 1635 5626 5504 5492
8522 8623 8623 5172 5172 5172 1801 1759 1635 5504 5582 5492
8624 8554 8522 5172 5172 5172 1635 1635 1635 5598 5504 5492
8522 8662 8662 5172 5172 5172 1759 1635 1635 5504 5582 5492
8624 8522 8522 5172 5172 5172 1635 1729 1635 5598 5504 5492
8522 8711 8623 5172 5172 5172 1635 1635 1635 5541 5582 5492
8571 8554 8522 5172 5172 5172 1737 1757 1635 5626 5541 5492
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A.2 Results of Experiment 2
Table A.4: Packets Captured for Experiment 2.
Packet Type Packets Captured (Events) Total Packets Captured Packets Sent (Trials)
Rep. 1 Rep. 2 Rep. 3
BT ON WORST 400 400 400 1200 1200
Wireshark 400 400 400 1200 1200
Average
Load (Mbps) 156.664 153.579 153.449 154.564
% of Max 15.67% 15.36% 15.34% 15.46%
SIP INVITE ON LARGE WORST 79 80 80 239 1200
Wireshark 400 400 400 1200 1200
Average
Load (Mbps) 994.402 997.901 992.099 994.801
% of Max 99.44% 99.79% 99.21% 99.48%
SIP BYE ON LARGE WORST 88 88 88 264 1200
Wireshark 400 400 400 1200 1200
Average
Load (Mbps) 944.62 952.483 945.451 947.518
% of Max 94.46% 95.25% 94.55% 94.75%
DNS OFF LARGE 343 348 348 1039 1200
Wireshark 400 400 400 1200 1200
Average
Load (Mbps) 242.339 243.776 228.405 238.173
% of Max 24.23% 24.38% 22.84% 23.82%
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A.3 Results of Experiment 3
Table A.5: Packets Captured for Experiment 3, Utilization 1 (≈20.4%).
Utilization 1 (≈20.4%)
Packet Type Packets Captured (Events) Total Packets Captured Packets Sent (Trials)
Rep. 1 Rep. 2 Rep. 3
BT ON WORST 300 300 300 900 900
Wireshark 286 288 289 863 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 204 204 204 204
% of Max 20.40% 20.40% 20.40% 20.40%
SIP INVITE ON LARGE WORST 300 300 300 900 900
Wireshark 290 284 290 864 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 204 204 204 204
% of Max 20.40% 20.40% 20.40% 20.40%
SIP BYE ON LARGE WORST 300 300 300 900 900
Wireshark 296 285 286 867 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 204 204 204 204
% of Max 20.40% 20.40% 20.40% 20.40%
DNS OFF LARGE 300 300 300 900 900
Wireshark 295 284 282 861 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 204 204 204 204
% of Max 20.40% 20.40% 20.40% 20.40%
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Table A.6: Packets Captured for Experiment 3, Utilization 2 (≈30.1%).
Utilization 2 (≈30.10%)
Packet Type Packets Captured (Events) Total Packets Captured Packets Sent (Trials)
Rep. 1 Rep. 2 Rep. 3
BT ON WORST 290 293 293 876 900
Wireshark 210 216 219 645 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 301 301 301 301
% of Max 30.10% 30.10% 30.10% 30.10%
SIP INVITE ON LARGE WORST 136 128 119 383 900
Wireshark 209 208 201 618 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 301 301 301 301
% of Max 30.10% 30.10% 30.10% 30.10%
SIP BYE ON LARGE WORST 192 190 189 571 900
Wireshark 187 216 207 610 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 301 301 301 301
% of Max 30.10% 30.10% 30.10% 30.10%
DNS OFF LARGE 294 294 293 881 900
Wireshark 182 184 223 589 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 301 301 301 301
% of Max 30.10% 30.10% 30.10% 30.10%
Table A.7: Packets Captured for Experiment 3, Utilization 3 (≈40.8%).
Utilization 3 (≈40.8%)
Packet Type Packets Captured (Events) Total Packets Captured Packets Sent (Trials)
Rep. 1 Rep. 2 Rep. 3
BT ON WORST 290 297 283 870 900
Wireshark 124 137 110 371 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 408 408 408 408
% of Max 40.80% 40.80% 40.80% 40.80%
SIP INVITE ON LARGE WORST 88 98 97 283 900
Wireshark 152 136 114 402 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 408 408 408 408
% of Max 40.80% 40.80% 40.80% 40.80%
SIP BYE ON LARGE WORST 156 158 153 467 900
Wireshark 123 131 124 378 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 408 408 408 408
% of Max 40.80% 40.80% 40.80% 40.80%
DNS OFF LARGE 287 292 289 868 900
Wireshark 138 140 127 405 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 408 408 408 408
% of Max 40.80% 40.80% 40.80% 40.80%
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Table A.8: Packets Captured for Experiment 3, Utilization 4 (≈49.8%).
Utilization 4 (≈49.8%)
Packet Type Packets Captured (Events) Total Packets Captured Packets Sent (Trials)
Rep. 1 Rep. 2 Rep. 3
BT ON WORST 292 292 290 874 900
Wireshark 106 111 119 336 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 498 498 498 498
% of Max 49.80% 49.80% 49.80% 49.80%
SIP INVITE ON LARGE WORST 91 77 78 246 900
Wireshark 89 112 112 313 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 498 498 498 498
% of Max 49.80% 49.80% 49.80% 49.80%
SIP BYE ON LARGE WORST 145 143 126 414 900
Wireshark 91 91 95 277 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 498 498 498 498
% of Max 49.80% 49.80% 49.80% 49.80%
DNS OFF LARGE 292 287 286 865 900
Wireshark 129 95 96 320 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 498 498 498 498
% of Max 49.80% 49.80% 49.80% 49.80%
Table A.9: Packets Captured for Experiment 3, Utilization 5 (≈60.2%).
Utilization 5 (≈60.2%)
Packet Type Packets Captured (Events) Total Packets Captured Packets Sent (Trials)
Rep. 1 Rep. 2 Rep. 3
BT ON WORST 285 286 291 862 900
Wireshark 74 80 76 230 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 602 602 602 602
% of Max 60.20% 60.20% 60.20% 60.20%
SIP INVITE ON LARGE WORST 97 79 74 250 900
Wireshark 77 81 75 233 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 602 602 602 602
% of Max 60.20% 60.20% 60.20% 60.20%
SIP BYE ON LARGE WORST 166 144 155 465 900
Wireshark 97 103 80 280 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 602 602 602 602
% of Max 60.20% 60.20% 60.20% 60.20%
DNS OFF LARGE 266 278 275 819 900
Wireshark 89 95 99 283 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 602 602 602 602
% of Max 60.20% 60.20% 60.20% 60.20%
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Table A.10: Packets Captured for Experiment 3, Utilization 6 (≈71.4%).
Utilization 6 (≈71.4%)
Packet Type Packets Captured (Events) Total Packets Captured Packets Sent (Trials)
Rep. 1 Rep. 2 Rep. 3
BT ON WORST 285 278 288 851 900
Wireshark 77 76 59 212 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 714 714 714 714
% of Max 71.40% 71.40% 71.40% 71.40%
SIP INVITE ON LARGE WORST 75 76 76 227 900
Wireshark 67 63 73 203 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 714 714 714 714
% of Max 71.40% 71.40% 71.40% 71.40%
SIP BYE ON LARGE WORST 146 136 142 424 900
Wireshark 85 71 74 230 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 714 714 714 714
% of Max 71.40% 71.40% 71.40% 71.40%
DNS OFF LARGE 279 270 279 828 900
Wireshark 71 69 66 206 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 714 714 714 714
% of Max 71.40% 71.40% 71.40% 71.40%
Table A.11: Packets Captured for Experiment 3, Utilization 7 (≈81.8%).
Utilization 7 (≈81.8%)
Packet Type Packets Captured (Events) Total Packets Captured Packets Sent (Trials)
Rep. 1 Rep. 2 Rep. 3
BT ON WORST 284 286 292 862 900
Wireshark 72 59 57 188 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 818 818 818 818
% of Max 81.80% 81.80% 81.80% 81.80%
SIP INVITE ON LARGE WORST 63 64 82 209 900
Wireshark 56 77 65 198 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 818 818 818 818
% of Max 81.80% 81.80% 81.80% 81.80%
SIP BYE ON LARGE WORST 152 144 113 409 900
Wireshark 73 56 50 179 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 818 818 818 818
% of Max 81.80% 81.80% 81.80% 81.80%
DNS OFF LARGE 268 265 269 802 900
Wireshark 75 79 71 225 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 818 818 818 818
% of Max 81.80% 81.80% 81.80% 81.80%
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Table A.12: Packets Captured for Experiment 3, Utilization 8 (≈93.7%).
Utilization 8 (Max ≈ 93.7%)
Packet Type Packets Captured (Events) Total Packets Captured Packets Sent (Trials)
Rep. 1 Rep. 2 Rep. 3
BT ON WORST 287 289 284 860 900
Wireshark 54 48 53 155 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 937 937 937 937
% of Max 93.70% 93.70% 93.70% 93.70%
SIP INVITE ON LARGE WORST 72 58 57 187 900
Wireshark 53 53 41 147 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 937 937 937 937
% of Max 93.70% 93.70% 93.70% 93.70%
SIP BYE ON LARGE WORST 117 106 111 334 900
Wireshark 53 46 44 143 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 937 937 937 937
% of Max 93.70% 93.70% 93.70% 93.70%
DNS OFF LARGE 273 275 279 827 900
Wireshark 53 59 50 162 900
Average
Utilization (Mbps) 937 937 937 937
% of Max 93.70% 93.70% 93.70% 93.70%
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A.4 Results of Experiment 4
Table A.13: CPU Cycle Data for Experiment 4.
List Size 2,000 4,000 8,000 16,000
Packet Rep 1 Rep 2 Rep 3 Rep 1 Rep 2 Rep 3 Rep 1 Rep 2 Rep 3 Rep 1 Rep 2 Rep 3
1 5646 5759 5636 5662 5662 5650 5678 5678 5666 5694 5694 5682
2 5748 5646 5636 5764 5738 5650 5754 5743 5666 5770 5754 5682
3 5646 5722 5636 5662 5662 5650 5678 5678 5666 5743 5742 5682
4 5748 5729 5636 5764 5775 5650 5743 5754 5666 5759 5770 5682
5 5646 5722 5636 5662 5662 5650 5678 5678 5666 5694 5694 5682
6 5768 5646 5636 5764 5738 5650 5754 5791 5666 5743 5770 5682
7 5646 5722 5636 5662 5662 5650 5678 5678 5666 5694 5694 5682
8 5768 5646 5636 5764 5738 5650 5738 5738 5666 5770 5770 5682
9 5646 5722 5636 5662 5675 5650 5678 5678 5666 5694 5694 5682
10 5744 5646 5636 5764 5790 5650 5738 5756 5666 5743 5759 5682
11 5646 5722 5636 5662 5662 5650 5717 5678 5666 5694 5694 5682
12 5740 5646 5636 5764 5738 5650 5754 5754 5666 5770 5759 5682
13 5679 5722 5636 5662 5662 5650 5678 5678 5666 5694 5694 5682
14 5803 5646 5636 5764 5738 5650 5771 5754 5666 5759 5824 5682
15 5691 5722 5636 5662 5662 5650 5678 5678 5666 5694 5694 5682
16 5768 5698 5636 5776 5738 5650 5754 5779 5666 5743 5811 5682
17 5646 5735 5636 5662 5714 5650 5678 5678 5666 5694 5694 5682
18 5768 5646 5636 5764 5738 5650 5754 5816 5666 5823 5840 5682
19 5646 5722 5636 5662 5662 5650 5678 5678 5666 5694 5745 5682
20 5740 5646 5636 5764 5738 5650 5754 5754 5666 5743 5807 5682
21 5646 5722 5636 5662 5662 5650 5678 5742 5666 5694 5694 5682
22 5740 5646 5636 5764 5738 5650 5754 5878 5666 5754 5770 5682
23 5646 5780 5636 5662 5662 5650 5678 5678 5666 5694 5746 5682
24 5748 5646 5636 5764 5738 5650 5743 5775 5666 5759 5902 5682
25 5646 5930 5636 5662 5662 5650 5678 5678 5666 5694 5787 5682
26 5748 5646 5636 5764 5738 5650 5743 5846 5666 5770 5796 5682
27 5646 5722 5636 5662 5890 5650 5678 5726 5666 5694 5726 5682
28 5768 5846 5636 5764 5935 5650 5793 5754 5666 5743 6023 5682
29 5646 5814 5636 5699 5879 5650 5678 5698 5666 5694 5694 5682
30 5748 5698 5636 5764 5856 5650 5818 6006 5666 5770 5946 5682
31 5646 5706 5636 5662 5775 5650 5678 5678 5666 5694 5694 5682
32 5740 5790 5636 5764 5738 5650 5754 5806 5666 5827 5770 5682
33 5646 6090 5636 5662 5662 5650 5678 5823 5666 5694 5694 5682
34 5768 5646 5636 5764 5894 5650 5727 5966 5666 5809 5770 5682
35 5646 5722 5636 5693 5662 5650 5678 5678 5666 5694 5775 5682
36 5768 5646 5636 5764 5738 5650 5754 5754 5666 5759 5770 5682
37 5646 5722 5636 5662 5662 5650 5678 5678 5666 5694 5735 5682
38 5773 5646 5636 5764 5799 5650 5754 5754 5666 5759 5819 5682
39 5646 5792 5636 5662 5714 5650 5678 5678 5666 5694 5694 5682
40 5748 5646 5636 5764 5738 5650 5743 5754 5666 5816 5770 5682
41 5646 5722 5636 5662 5662 5650 5678 5678 5666 5694 5694 5682
42 5768 5646 5636 5801 5738 5650 5743 5754 5666 5770 5783 5682
43 5646 5748 5636 5662 5675 5650 5678 5678 5666 5694 5694 5682
44 5768 5703 5636 5764 5738 5650 5727 5754 5666 5770 5770 5682
45 5646 5722 5636 5662 5679 5650 5678 5678 5666 5694 5694 5682
46 5748 5646 5636 5784 5738 5650 5743 5754 5666 5759 5780 5682
47 5646 5722 5636 5662 5662 5650 5678 5678 5666 5694 5731 5682
48 5740 5646 5636 5764 5738 5650 5754 5754 5666 5743 5770 5682
49 5646 5722 5636 5705 5662 5650 5678 5678 5666 5694 5694 5682
50 5740 5646 5636 5764 5738 5650 5777 5754 5666 5770 5770 5682
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Table A.14: CPU Cycle Data for Experiment 4 Continued.
32,000 64,000 128,000 256,000
Rep 1 Rep 2 Rep 3 Rep 1 Rep 2 Rep 3 Rep 1 Rep 2 Rep 3 Rep 1 Rep 2 Rep 3
5710 5710 5698 5775 5726 5714 5742 5783 5738 5766 5766 5754
5786 5775 5698 5802 5791 5714 5815 5814 5738 5835 5835 5754
5710 5758 5698 5726 5741 5717 5742 5750 5738 5766 5766 5754
5775 5775 5698 5819 5863 5718 5826 5814 5738 5869 5887 5754
5710 5710 5698 5726 5726 5714 5742 5750 5738 5766 5823 5754
5775 5775 5698 5791 5802 5714 5815 5830 5738 5835 5846 5754
5710 5710 5698 5733 5726 5714 5742 5750 5738 5766 5766 5754
5828 5775 5698 5791 5802 5714 5803 5819 5738 5819 5835 5754
5710 5710 5698 5726 5726 5714 5742 5750 5738 5766 5766 5754
5759 5828 5698 5835 5837 5714 5826 5817 5738 5846 5846 5754
5733 5710 5698 5726 5726 5714 5742 5802 5738 5811 5766 5754
5794 5786 5698 5845 5791 5714 5815 5830 5738 5835 5835 5754
5710 5710 5698 5726 5726 5714 5742 5750 5738 5766 5766 5754
5791 5775 5698 5791 5791 5714 5826 5914 5738 5846 5835 5754
5710 5710 5698 5726 5726 5714 5742 5818 5738 5766 5766 5754
5775 5775 5698 5791 5791 5714 5815 5904 5738 5835 5846 5754
5710 5810 5698 5726 5726 5714 5742 5839 5738 5766 5801 5754
5786 5795 5698 5791 5791 5714 5826 5927 5738 5819 5835 5754
5710 5710 5698 5726 5778 5714 5742 5854 5738 5766 5818 5754
5786 5823 5698 5791 5811 5714 5815 5830 5738 5846 5835 5754
5710 5710 5698 5726 5882 5714 5742 6046 5738 5766 5934 5754
5775 5796 5698 5791 5797 5714 5826 5922 5738 5846 5914 5754
5710 5762 5698 5726 5726 5714 5742 5834 5738 5766 5890 5754
5835 5882 5698 5802 5886 5714 5815 5856 5738 5835 5846 5754
5710 5810 5698 5726 5890 5714 5742 5818 5738 5823 5905 5757
5775 5920 5698 5791 5855 5714 5826 5962 5738 5835 6179 5754
5710 5846 5698 5726 5726 5714 5742 5750 5738 5766 5766 5754
5775 5796 5698 5775 6202 5714 5815 5882 5738 5819 6062 5754
5717 5882 5698 5773 5778 5714 5742 5750 5738 5766 5818 5754
5775 5972 5698 5802 5802 5714 5826 5839 5738 5846 5995 5754
5710 5710 5698 5726 5990 5714 5742 5750 5738 5766 5862 5754
5811 5850 5698 5791 5791 5714 5826 5830 5738 5846 5835 5754
5710 5710 5698 5726 5726 5714 5742 5750 5738 5766 5818 5754
5775 5786 5698 5791 5825 5714 5826 5845 5738 5846 5846 5754
5710 5710 5698 5726 5726 5714 5742 5799 5738 5766 5766 5754
5786 5786 5698 5786 5802 5714 5815 5830 5738 5819 5846 5754
5710 5710 5698 5726 5726 5714 5742 5750 5738 5766 5766 5754
5775 5786 5698 5786 5802 5714 5826 5830 5738 5830 5846 5754
5710 5749 5698 5726 5726 5714 5742 5783 5738 5766 5766 5754
5786 5786 5698 5802 5802 5714 5826 5830 5738 5846 5883 5754
5710 5710 5698 5726 5726 5714 5742 5750 5738 5803 5766 5754
5823 5786 5698 5806 5802 5714 5866 5872 5738 5846 5846 5754
5710 5710 5698 5726 5765 5714 5742 5750 5738 5766 5766 5754
5786 5786 5698 5791 5802 5714 5826 5830 5738 5846 5846 5754
5710 5710 5698 5726 5726 5714 5742 5750 5738 5766 5807 5754
5811 5786 5698 5802 5802 5714 5841 5830 5738 5819 5846 5754
5710 5710 5698 5726 5726 5714 5742 5750 5738 5766 5766 5754
5775 5786 5698 5802 5802 5714 5826 5830 5738 5899 5846 5754
5710 5710 5698 5726 5749 5714 5742 5750 5738 5766 5766 5754
5786 5786 5698 5802 5802 5714 5857 5830 5738 5846 5846 5754
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Table A.15: CPU Cycle Data for Experiment 4 Continued.
512,000 1,024,000 2,048,000 4,096,000
Rep 1 Rep 2 Rep 3 Rep 1 Rep 2 Rep 3 Rep 1 Rep 2 Rep 3 Rep 1 Rep 2 Rep 3
5782 5782 5770 5798 5798 5786 5851 5814 5802 5834 5834 5822
5847 5851 5770 5878 5867 5786 5894 5954 5802 5914 5909 5822
5782 5782 5770 5798 5798 5786 5855 5814 5802 5834 5834 5822
5847 5914 5770 5867 5919 5786 5883 5878 5802 5903 5951 5822
5782 5782 5770 5798 5798 5786 5814 5814 5802 5834 5834 5822
5847 5862 5770 5867 5878 5786 5883 5878 5802 5903 5887 5822
5782 5782 5770 5798 5798 5786 5814 5814 5802 5834 5834 5822
5831 5885 5770 5851 5878 5786 5867 5894 5802 5887 5914 5822
5782 5782 5770 5798 5798 5786 5814 5814 5802 5834 6534 5822
5893 5862 5770 5878 5867 5786 5894 5883 5802 5914 5941 5822
5782 5782 5770 5798 5798 5786 5814 5814 5802 5834 5882 5822
5847 5851 5770 5878 5878 5786 5883 5883 5802 5903 5898 5822
5782 5782 5770 5798 5798 5786 5814 5814 5802 5834 5834 5822
5847 5851 5770 5867 5867 5786 5894 5935 5802 5914 5966 5822
5782 5782 5770 5798 5798 5786 5814 5814 5802 5834 5834 5822
5847 5851 5770 5867 5919 5786 5894 5950 5802 5914 5914 5822
5782 5782 5770 5798 5798 5786 5814 5814 5802 5834 5902 5822
5842 5862 5770 5867 5867 5786 5878 6033 5802 5887 6022 5822
5782 5886 5770 5798 5854 5786 5814 6414 5802 5834 5938 5822
5858 5885 5770 5867 5878 5786 5929 5883 5802 5914 5914 5822
5782 5834 5770 5798 6462 5786 5814 5866 5802 5834 5886 5822
5858 5919 5770 5867 5919 5786 5894 5894 5802 5914 6055 5822
5782 6315 5770 5798 5798 5786 5814 5942 5802 5834 5918 5822
5847 5914 5770 5878 5930 5786 5883 5894 5802 5903 5940 5822
5782 5874 5770 5798 5902 5786 5814 5886 5802 5834 5902 5822
5847 5851 5770 5867 5867 5786 5894 5972 5802 5914 6010 5822
5782 5782 5770 5798 5798 5786 5814 5962 5802 5834 5834 5822
5847 6078 5770 5851 6282 5786 5883 6018 5802 5887 5966 5822
5782 5843 5770 5798 5850 5786 5814 5814 5802 5834 5834 5822
5858 6011 5770 5927 5878 5786 5894 6047 5802 5914 5914 5822
5782 5878 5770 5798 5850 5786 5814 5914 5802 5834 5834 5822
5858 5862 5770 5878 5878 5786 5894 5883 5802 5914 5951 5822
5782 5834 5770 5798 5798 5786 5814 5866 5802 5834 5834 5822
5842 5911 5770 5867 5878 5786 5894 5894 5802 5914 5914 5822
5782 5782 5770 5798 5798 5786 5814 5814 5802 5834 5834 5822
5842 5899 5770 5862 5931 5786 5919 5894 5802 5903 5914 5822
5782 5782 5770 5811 5798 5786 5814 5814 5802 5834 5834 5822
5858 5916 5770 5862 5878 5786 5894 5894 5802 5914 5967 5822
5782 5782 5770 5798 5798 5786 5814 5814 5802 5834 5863 5822
5892 5862 5770 5896 5878 5786 5894 5894 5802 5914 5914 5822
5782 5782 5770 5798 5798 5786 5814 5814 5802 5834 5834 5822
5858 5862 5770 5878 5878 5786 5904 5894 5802 5914 5914 5822
5782 5782 5770 5798 5798 5786 5814 5814 5802 5834 5834 5822
5858 5862 5770 5867 5878 5786 5894 5894 5802 5914 5914 5822
5782 5782 5770 5798 5798 5786 5814 5814 5802 5834 5834 5822
5858 5862 5770 5878 5928 5786 5883 5894 5802 5903 5914 5822
5782 5782 5770 5798 5798 5786 5814 5814 5802 5865 5881 5822
5858 5862 5770 5878 5878 5786 5883 5894 5802 5903 5914 5822
5782 5782 5770 5798 5798 5786 5814 5814 5802 5834 5834 5822
5847 5862 5770 5878 5878 5786 5883 5894 5802 5914 5914 5822
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Table A.16: CPU Cycle Data for Experiment 4 Continued.
8,192,000 16,384,000 32,768,000 65,536,000
Rep 1 Rep 2 Rep 3 Rep 1 Rep 2 Rep 3 Rep 1 Rep 2 Rep 3 Rep 1 Rep 2 Rep 3
5850 5902 5839 5866 5866 5854 5882 6746 5870 5902 5954 5890
5930 5919 5838 5946 5935 5854 6003 5951 5870 5971 5974 5890
5850 5850 5838 5866 5866 5854 5882 5882 5870 5902 5902 5890
5919 5919 5838 5935 6679 5854 5951 5951 5870 5982 6022 5890
5850 5881 5838 5866 5866 5854 5882 5919 5870 5902 5902 5890
5919 6643 5838 5935 5935 5854 5951 5951 5870 5971 6124 5890
5850 5850 5838 5866 5866 5854 5882 5891 5870 5902 5902 5890
5903 5932 5838 5919 5946 5854 5935 6004 5870 5971 5974 5890
5850 5930 5838 5866 5918 5854 5882 5938 5870 5902 5954 5890
5930 5914 5838 5946 5943 5854 5962 5946 5870 5971 5963 5890
5850 5902 5838 5866 5918 5854 5882 5990 5870 5902 6120 5890
5919 5914 5838 5961 5930 5854 5951 5946 5870 5971 5963 5890
5850 5850 5838 5866 5871 5854 5882 5882 5870 5902 5902 5890
5930 5982 5838 5946 5998 5854 5962 6014 5870 5982 6000 5890
5850 5850 5838 5915 5866 5854 5882 5882 5870 5902 5970 5890
5930 5987 5838 5946 5946 5854 5962 5962 5870 5982 6027 5890
5850 5918 5838 5866 5934 5854 5882 5954 5870 5902 5902 5890
5963 6038 5838 5935 6054 5854 5999 6074 5870 5971 6092 5980
5850 5954 5838 5911 5970 5854 5882 5986 5870 5902 5902 5890
5988 5993 5838 5935 5946 5854 5951 5962 5870 5982 6158 5890
5850 5902 5838 5866 5918 5854 5882 5934 5870 5902 5902 5890
5952 6022 5838 5946 6106 5854 5962 6080 5870 5982 6004 5890
5850 5997 5838 5866 6014 5854 5921 5966 5870 5902 5958 5890
5919 5956 5838 5935 5972 5854 5951 5988 5870 5971 5974 5890
5850 5918 5838 5866 5934 5854 5882 5954 5870 5902 5902 5890
5930 6026 5838 5984 6042 5854 5962 6062 5870 5971 5974 5890
5850 5850 5838 5866 5866 5854 5882 5882 5870 5902 5902 5890
5930 5982 5838 5919 5998 5854 6002 6014 5870 5971 6009 5890
5850 5850 5838 5866 5903 5854 5882 5882 5870 5959 5902 5890
5930 5930 5838 5983 5946 5854 5962 5962 5870 5993 5974 5890
5850 5887 5838 5866 5866 5854 5882 5931 5870 5902 5902 5890
5930 5930 5838 5946 5946 5854 5962 5962 5870 5971 5974 5890
5850 5850 5838 5866 5866 5854 5882 5882 5870 5902 5902 5890
5930 5930 5838 5946 5946 5854 5962 6011 5870 5971 5974 5890
5850 5850 5838 5866 5866 5854 5882 5882 5870 5902 5902 5890
5919 5930 5838 5935 5946 5854 5951 5962 5870 5982 5974 5890
5850 5850 5838 5866 5866 5854 5882 5882 5870 5902 5902 5890
5930 5967 5838 5930 5946 5854 5983 5962 5870 5982 5974 5890
5850 5850 5838 5866 5866 5854 5882 5882 5870 5902 5902 5890
5930 5930 5838 5946 5957 5854 5962 5962 5870 5971 5974 5890
5850 5850 5838 5866 5866 5854 5882 5882 5870 5902 5943 5890
5930 5930 5838 5946 5946 5854 5962 5962 5870 5982 5974 5890
5850 5850 5838 5866 5866 5854 5882 5882 5870 5902 5902 5890
5953 5930 5838 5946 5946 5854 5962 6011 5870 6031 5974 5890
5907 5850 5838 5866 5866 5854 5882 5882 5870 5902 5902 5890
5953 5930 5838 5978 5946 5854 5951 5962 5870 5971 5974 5890
5850 5887 5838 5866 5866 5854 5882 5882 5870 5902 5902 5890
5919 5930 5838 5967 6008 5854 5951 5962 5870 5971 5974 5890
5850 5850 5838 5866 5866 5854 5882 5923 5870 5902 5902 5890
5919 5930 5838 5946 5946 5854 5951 5962 5870 5971 6016 5996
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Table A.17: CPU Cycle Data for Experiment 4 Continued.
131,072,000
Rep 1 Rep 2 Rep 3
5918 5918 5906
5998 5971 5906
5918 5918 5906
5998 5999 5906
5918 5918 5906
5998 5971 5906
5918 5918 5906
5998 5971 5906
5918 5918 5906
6051 5971 5906
5918 5918 5906
6004 5971 5906
5918 5918 5906
5998 5971 5906
5918 5918 5906
5998 5987 5906
5918 5918 5906
5998 5971 5906
5918 5918 5906
5998 5971 5906
5918 5918 5906
5998 5971 5906
5918 5918 5906
5998 5971 5906
5918 5918 5906
5998 5971 5906
5943 5918 5906
5998 5971 5906
5918 5918 5906
6063 6070 5906
5918 5918 5906
5998 5971 5906
5918 5918 5906
5998 5971 5906
5918 5918 5906
5998 5971 5906
5918 5918 5906
5998 5986 5906
5951 5918 5906
5998 5971 5906
5918 5918 5906
5998 5994 5906
5918 5918 5906
5998 5971 5906
5918 5918 5906
5998 5971 5906
5918 5918 5906
5998 5971 5906
5918 5918 5906
5998 6005 5906
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Appendix B. Pilot Test Data
This appendix contains the pilot test data used to make decisions in designingthe TRAPP-2 system. Section B.1.1 investigates the BRAM versus SDRAM
memory scheme processing times. Section B.1.2 determines the additional CPU cycles
required to detect DNS packets. Section B.1.3 compares the number of CPU cycles
required to sdbm hash the smallest and largest SIP/DNS domains. Section B.1.4
compares the number of CPU cycles required to copy the smallest and largest packet
sizes into a software buffer.
B.1 Results of Pilot Studies
B.1.1 BRAM versus SDRAM Memory Scheme. Table B.1 contains the
number of CPU cycles required to process a SIP packet for the BRAM and SDRAM
memory configurations. For each configuration, 50 packets are sent to the apparatus
and the number of CPU cycles required to process the packet are recorded in the table.
The SDRAM memory scheme averages 16,076 CPU cycles, and the BRAM memory
scheme averages 15,299 CPU cycles. The average difference between the memory
schemes is 777 CPU cycles. The design decision is to accept the average increase of
777 CPU cycles for the larger addressable memory range, thus the SDRAM memory
scheme is selected.
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Table B.1: CPU Cycles Used to Process a SIP Packet.
Packet BRAM SDRAM
1 19554 21119
2 15304 16037
3 15227 15949
4 15367 15979
5 15272 15910
6 15296 16007
7 15259 15959
8 15354 15989
9 15320 15978
10 15324 15921
11 15147 16012
12 15321 16019
13 15337 15911
14 15274 15915
15 15196 15977
16 15397 15958
17 15275 15933
18 15242 15973
19 15256 16025
20 15361 15992
21 15117 16019
22 15158 15911
23 14876 16009
24 14989 15938
25 15289 15979
26 15406 16065
27 15409 15911
28 15402 15943
29 15179 15910
30 14770 15917
31 14789 16005
32 14854 16005
33 15441 15938
34 15334 15984
35 15705 16013
36 15947 15955
37 15120 15989
38 15056 15988
39 15057 16019
40 15111 15929
41 15120 15921
42 15044 15992
43 15057 15961
44 15111 15981
45 15120 16021
46 15056 15968
47 15057 16019
48 15111 15959
49 15121 15985
50 15041 16025
Average 15,299 16,076
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B.1.2 DNS Packet Detection. Table B.2 contains the number of cycles
required to identify a DNS packet. 50 packets are sent to the TRAPP-2 system, and
the number of CPU cycles required to identify a DNS packet is recorded in the table.
The system averages 23 CPU cycles to identify a DNS packet.
Table B.2: CPU Cycles Used to Identify a DNS Packet.
Packet CPU Cycles
1 23
2 23
3 23
4 23
5 23
6 23
7 23
8 23
9 23
10 23
11 23
12 23
13 23
14 23
15 23
16 23
17 23
18 23
19 23
20 23
21 23
22 23
23 23
24 23
25 23
26 23
27 23
28 23
29 23
30 23
31 23
32 23
33 23
34 23
35 23
36 23
37 23
38 23
39 23
40 23
41 23
42 23
43 23
44 23
45 23
46 23
47 23
48 23
49 23
50 23
Average 23
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B.1.3 sdbm Hashing Times. Table B.3 contains the number of CPU cycles
required to process the smallest and largest SIP domain address. 50 packets with
a six-character domain and 50 packets with a 212-character domain are sent to the
TRAPP-2 system; the number of CPU cycles required to process the packets are
recorded in the table. The system averages 86 CPU cycles to sdbm hash a six-
character domain and 1195 to sdbm hash a 212-character domain.
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Table B.3: CPU Cycles Used to sdbm hash a SIP Packet.
Packet Small Domain Large Domain
1 86 1195
2 86 1195
3 86 1195
4 86 1195
5 86 1195
6 86 1195
7 86 1195
8 86 1195
9 86 1195
10 86 1195
11 86 1195
12 86 1195
13 86 1195
14 86 1195
15 86 1195
16 86 1195
17 86 1195
18 86 1195
19 86 1195
20 86 1195
21 86 1195
22 86 1195
23 86 1195
24 86 1195
25 86 1195
26 86 1195
27 86 1195
28 86 1195
29 86 1195
30 86 1195
31 86 1195
32 86 1195
33 86 1195
34 86 1195
35 86 1195
36 86 1195
37 86 1195
38 86 1195
39 86 1195
40 86 1195
41 86 1195
42 86 1195
43 86 1195
44 86 1195
45 86 1195
46 86 1195
47 86 1195
48 86 1195
49 86 1195
50 86 1195
Average 86 1195
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B.1.4 Packet Size Transfer Times. Table B.4 below contains the number of
CPU cycles required to transfer a packet from the TRAPP-2 system into the software
buffer. 50 packets with a size of 67 bytes and 50 packets with a size of 1,500 bytes
are sent to the TRAPP-2 system; the number of CPU cycles required to process the
packets are recorded in the table. The system averages 999 CPU cycles to transfer a
67 byte packet and 18,112 CPU cycles to transfer a 1,500 byte packet.
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Table B.4: CPU Cycles Used to Copy Smallest versus Largest Packet.
Packet 67-Byte Packet 1500-Byte Packet
1 999 18112
2 999 18112
3 999 18112
4 999 18112
5 999 18112
6 999 18112
7 999 18112
8 999 18112
9 999 18112
10 999 18112
11 999 18112
12 999 18112
13 999 18112
14 999 18112
15 999 18112
16 999 18112
17 999 18112
18 999 18112
19 999 18112
20 999 18112
21 999 18112
22 999 18112
23 999 18112
24 999 18112
25 999 18112
26 999 18112
27 999 18112
28 999 18112
29 999 18112
30 999 18112
31 999 18112
32 999 18112
33 999 18112
34 999 18112
35 999 18112
36 999 18112
37 999 18112
38 999 18112
39 999 18112
40 999 18112
41 999 18112
42 999 18112
43 999 18112
44 999 18112
45 999 18112
46 999 18112
47 999 18112
48 999 18112
49 999 18112
50 999 18112
Average 999 18112
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Appendix C. Constructing the TRAPP-2 System Hardware
This appendix contains the step-by-step guide to constructing the hardware por-tion of the TRAPP-2 system. Section C.1 provides a description of the hard-
ware used in the TRAPP-2 system. Section C.2 covers the steps used to construct the
TRAPP-2 system using the Base System Builder in Xilinx Platform Studio, version
11.4. Section C.3 details the required software modifications in the hardware files to
convert the Ethernet controller from 100 Mbps (Media Independent Interface) to 1000
Mbps (Reduced Gigabit Media Independent Interface v2.0).
C.1 Hardware Description
C.1.1 Microprocessor. The on-chip PowerPC 440 processor is used in the
TRAPP-2 system. The processor executes the software application.
C.1.2 Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory. Two 512 MB SDRAM
modules are used for the TRAPP-2 system. The first module is formated as Xilinx
Memory File System to temporarily store the hash file before the hashes are trans-
ferred to the second SDRAM module. The second module does not have a file system
and contains the actual hashes for the hash list. The second module also stores the
log file during sniffing. At the completion of sniffing, the log file is transferred to the
first SDRAM module so it can be downloaded from the FPGA board.
C.1.3 Block Random Access Memory. For this implementation, one 128-
kilobyte BRAM is used. The BRAM block contains the bootup software code, data
and instruction memory, as well as the stack and heap.
C.1.4 XPS Hard Ethernet Media Access Controller. This is the board’s
Ethernet connection. The Ethernet controller is set to promiscuous mode to receive
all packets traversing the network. The Ethernet controller is configured as a RGMII
v2.0, capable of operating at 1000 Mbps. More details on programing the Ethernet
controller to operate as a RGMII interface can be found in Section C.3.
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C.1.5 RS232 Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter. The RS232
interface serves two purposes. The first is to output general information about board
initialization and operational status as well as detect user input to stop sniffing. The
second purpose is to upload hash files to the board and download the Wireshark-
compatible log file. This is accomplished with the xmodem protocol through the
TeraTerm Virtual Terminal program [Ter09].
C.1.6 XPS Timer. The timer is used to take timestamps for calculating
the packet processing time, measured in CPU cycles. Only one of the two available
timers is used.
C.2 Component Configuration
This section provides a step-by-step guide to construct the TRAPP-2 system
using the Base System Builder in Xilinx Platform Studio, version 11.4.
1. To begin Open Xilinx Platform Studio, Click on File, then New Project. A
window will appear like the one in Figure C.1.
Figure C.1: The Project Creation Options Window.
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2. Name the project file, as seen in Figure C.2. Click “OK” to continue.
Figure C.2: The Project Creation and Repository Selection Window.
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3. Select the “I would like to create a new design” radio button as seen in Fig-
ure C.3. Click “Next” to continue.
Figure C.3: The Base System Builder Design Selection Window.
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4. Select the “I would like to create a system for the following development board”
radio button. Choose “Xilinx” for the Board Vendor, “Virtex 5 ML510 Evalu-
ation Platform” for the Board Name, and “C” for the Board Revision, as seen
in Figure C.4. Click “Next” to continue.
Figure C.4: The Board Selection Window.
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5. Select the “Single-Processor System” radio button as seen in Figure C.5. Click
“Next” to continue.
Figure C.5: The Processor Selection Window.
115
6. Select the “PowerPC” for the Processor Type, “400.00” for Processor Clock
Frequency, and “100.00” for the Bus Clock Frequency, as seen in Figure C.6.
Click “Next” to continue.
Figure C.6: The Processor Configuration Window.
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7. Add the following peripherals, ensuring to change certain options (shown in
parenthesis) from the dropdown menus, as seen in Figure C.7. The peripherals
include:
• DDR2 SDRAM DIMM0
• DDR2 SDRAM DIMM1
• Hard Ethernet MAC
• RS232 Uart 1 (Set Baud Rate to 115200)
• xps bram if cntlr 0 (Set Size to 128 KB)
• xps timer 0
Click “Next” to continue.
Figure C.7: The Peripheral Configuration Window.
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8. Check every box for enabling the Data and Instruction caches for the processor,
as seen in Figure C.8. Click “Next” to continue.
Figure C.8: The Processor Cache Configuration Window.
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9. The Memory and Peripheral Test Applications are optional, but highly recom-
mended to ensure the board is functioning properly. Select xps bram if cntlr 0
as the location to store the test applications, as seen in Figure C.9. Click “Next”
to continue.
Figure C.9: The Application Selection Window.
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10. This window summarizes the system being built, as seen in Figure C.10. Click
“Finish” to continue.
Figure C.10: The Summary Configuration Window.
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11. After completing the Base System Builder, a window pops up asking about
additional configuration settings. Select the “Configure drivers and libraries
(Software Platform)” radio button, as seen in Figure C.11. Click “OK” to
continue.
Figure C.11: The Configure Libraries and Drivers Window.
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12. Highlight “Software Platform” in the left side column. Place a check in the
“xilmfs” checkbox, as seen in Figure C.12. Click “OK” to continue.
Figure C.12: The Software Platform Settings Window.
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13. Highlight “OS and Lib Configuration” in the left side column. Change the
following options: numbytes (100,000,000), base address = 0x0 (this is the base
address of the SDRAM that holds the Xilinx Memory File System), init type
(MFSINIT NEW), need utils (true), as seen in Figure C.13. Click “OK” to
continue. Ensure these values are accurately reflected in the .mss file.
Figure C.13: The Software Platform Settings OS and Lib Configuration Window.
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C.3 Converting from MII to RGMII v2.0
This section details the software modifications in the hardware files to convert
the Ethernet controller from 100 Mbps (MII) to 1000 Mbps (RGMII v2.0).
1. Configure HARD ETHERNET MAC IP
C_NUM_IDELAYCTRL=1
C_IDELAYCTRL_LOC=NOT_SET
Physical Interface Type = RGMII V2.0
RX FIFO Depth of TEMAC0 = 32768B
2. In the .mhs file, make the following modifications.
Remove all MII* from external ports and add the following lines:
PORT Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_TXD_0_pin = Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_TXD_0, DIR = O, VEC = [3:0]
PORT Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_TXC_0_pin = Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_TXC_0, DIR = O
PORT Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_TX_CTL_0_pin = Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_TX_CTL_0, DIR = O
PORT Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_RXD_0_pin = Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_RXD_0, DIR = I, VEC = [3:0]
PORT Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_RX_CTL_0_pin = Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_RX_CTL_0, DIR = I
PORT Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_RXC_0_pin = Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_RXC_0, DIR = I
In the xps ll temac section of the .mhs file, PORT REFCLK must be connected
to a 200MHz clock. The name may be different between designs.
Add:
PORT GTX_CLK_0 = clk_125mhz
PORT REFCLK = clk_200_0000MHzPLL0
PORT RGMII_RXD_0 = Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_RXD_0
PORT RGMII_RX_CTL_0 = Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_RX_CTL_0
PORT RGMII_RXC_0 = Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_RXC_0
PORT RGMII_TXC_0 = Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_TXC_0
PORT RGMII_TX_CTL_0 = Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_TX_CTL_0
PORT RGMII_TXD_0 = Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_TXD_0
In the clock generator section, a 125MHz clock must be added. The number
of the clock depends on the number of other clocks in your design. Since four
clocks already existed, the new one is C CLKOUT5.
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Add:
PARAMETER C_CLKOUT5_FREQ = 125000000
PARAMETER C_CLKOUT5_PHASE = 0
PARAMETER C_CLKOUT5_GROUP = NONE
PARAMETER C_CLKOUT5_BUF = TRUE
PORT CLKOUT5 = clk_125mhz
3. In the .ucf file, make the following modifications.
Remove:
Net fpga_0_Hard_Ethernet_MAC_MII_TXD_0_pin<3> LOC=AN31 | IOSTANDARD = LVCMOS25 | SLEW = FAST
| DRIVE = 6;
Net fpga_0_Hard_Ethernet_MAC_MII_TXD_0_pin<2> LOC=AR32 | IOSTANDARD = LVCMOS25 | SLEW = FAST
| DRIVE = 6;
Net fpga_0_Hard_Ethernet_MAC_MII_TXD_0_pin<1> LOC=AP32 | IOSTANDARD = LVCMOS25 | SLEW = FAST
| DRIVE = 6;
Net fpga_0_Hard_Ethernet_MAC_MII_TXD_0_pin<0> LOC=AR33 | IOSTANDARD = LVCMOS25 | SLEW = FAST
| DRIVE = 6;
Net fpga_0_Hard_Ethernet_MAC_MII_TX_EN_0_pin LOC=AP31 | IOSTANDARD = LVCMOS25 | SLEW = FAST
| DRIVE = 6;
Net fpga_0_Hard_Ethernet_MAC_MII_TX_ER_0_pin LOC=AT31 | IOSTANDARD = LVCMOS25 | SLEW = FAST
| DRIVE = 6;
Net fpga_0_Hard_Ethernet_MAC_MII_RXD_0_pin<3> LOC=AM33 | IOSTANDARD = LVCMOS25;
Net fpga_0_Hard_Ethernet_MAC_MII_RXD_0_pin<2> LOC=AK33 | IOSTANDARD = LVCMOS25;
Net fpga_0_Hard_Ethernet_MAC_MII_RXD_0_pin<1> LOC=AJ33 | IOSTANDARD = LVCMOS25;
Net fpga_0_Hard_Ethernet_MAC_MII_RXD_0_pin<0> LOC=AJ32 | IOSTANDARD = LVCMOS25;
Net fpga_0_Hard_Ethernet_MAC_MII_RX_DV_0_pin LOC=AN33 | IOSTANDARD = LVCMOS25;
Net fpga_0_Hard_Ethernet_MAC_MII_RX_ER_0_pin LOC=AP33 | IOSTANDARD = LVCMOS25;
Net fpga_0_Hard_Ethernet_MAC_MII_RX_CLK_0_pin LOC=J17 | IOSTANDARD = LVCMOS25;
Net fpga_0_Hard_Ethernet_MAC_MII_TX_CLK_0_pin LOC=M26 | IOSTANDARD = LVCMOS25;
Add:
Net Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_TXD_0_pin<3> LOC = AN31 | IOSTANDARD=LVCMOS25 | SLEW=FAST
| DRIVE = 24;
Net Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_TXD_0_pin<2> LOC = AR32 | IOSTANDARD=LVCMOS25 | SLEW=FAST
| DRIVE = 24;
Net Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_TXD_0_pin<1> LOC = AP32 | IOSTANDARD=LVCMOS25 | SLEW=FAST
| DRIVE = 24;
Net Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_TXD_0_pin<0> LOC = AR33 | IOSTANDARD=LVCMOS25 | SLEW=FAST
| DRIVE = 24;
Net Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_TX_CTL_0_pin LOC = AP31 | IOSTANDARD=LVCMOS25 | SLEW=FAST
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| DRIVE = 24;
Net Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_TXC_0_pin LOC = AM31 | IOSTANDARD =LVCMOS25 | SLEW = FAST
| DRIVE = 6;
Net Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_RXD_0_pin<3> LOC = AM33 | IOSTANDARD=LVCMOS25;
Net Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_RXD_0_pin<2> LOC = AK33 | IOSTANDARD=LVCMOS25;
Net Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_RXD_0_pin<1> LOC = AJ33 | IOSTANDARD=LVCMOS25;
Net Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_RXD_0_pin<0> LOC = AJ32 | IOSTANDARD=LVCMOS25;
Net Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_RX_CTL_0_pin LOC = AN33 | IOSTANDARD=LVCMOS25;
Net Hard_Ethernet_MAC_RGMII_RXC_0_pin LOC=J17 | IOSTANDARD=LVCMOS25;
Remove:
###### Hard_Ethernet_MAC
NET "*Hard_Ethernet_MAC/LlinkTemac0_CLK*" TNM_NET = "LLCLK0";
#name of signal connected to TEMAC LlinkTemac0_CLK input
NET "*Hard_Ethernet_MAC/SPLB_Clk*" TNM_NET = "PLBCLK";
#name of signal connected to TEMAC SPLB_Clk input
# EMAC0 TX Client Clock
NET "*Hard_Ethernet_MAC/TxClientClk_0" TNM_NET = "clk_client_tx0";
TIMEGRP "mii_client_clk_tx0" = "clk_client_tx0";
TIMESPEC "TS_mii_client_clk_tx0" = PERIOD "mii_client_clk_tx0"
7500 ps HIGH 50 %;
# EMAC0 RX Client Clock
NET "*Hard_Ethernet_MAC/RxClientClk_0" TNM_NET = "clk_client_rx0";
TIMEGRP "mii_client_clk_rx0" = "clk_client_rx0";
TIMESPEC "TS_gmii_client_clk_rx0" = PERIOD "gmii_client_clk_rx0" 7500 ps HIGH 50 %;
# EMAC0 RX PHY Clock
NET "*Hard_Ethernet_MAC/MII_RX_CLK_0*" TNM_NET = "phy_clk_rx0";
TIMEGRP "mii_clk_phy_rx0" = "phy_clk_rx0";
TIMESPEC "TS_mii_clk_phy_rx0" = PERIOD "mii_clk_phy_rx0" 40000 ps HIGH 50 %;
# EMAC0 TX MII 10/100 PHY Clock
NET "*Hard_Ethernet_MAC/MII_TX_CLK_0*" TNM_NET = "clk_mii_tx_clk0";
TIMESPEC "TS_mii_tx_clk0" = PERIOD "clk_mii_tx_clk0" 40000 ps HIGH 50 %;
# MII Receiver Constraints: place flip-flops in IOB
INST "*mii0*RXD_TO_MAC*" IOB = TRUE;
INST "*mii0*RX_DV_TO_MAC" IOB = TRUE;
INST "*mii0*RX_ER_TO_MAC" IOB = TRUE;
# PHY spec: 10ns setup time, 10ns hold time
# Assumes equal length board traces
NET "fpga_0_Hard_Ethernet_MAC_MII_RXD_0_pin(?)" TNM = "mii_rx_0";
NET "fpga_0_Hard_Ethernet_MAC_MII_RX_DV_0_pin" TNM = "mii_rx_0";
NET "fpga_0_Hard_Ethernet_MAC_MII_RX_ER_0_pin" TNM = "mii_rx_0";
TIMEGRP "mii_rx_0" OFFSET = IN 10 ns VALID 20 ns BEFORE
"fpga_0_Hard_Ethernet_MAC_MII_RX_CLK_0_pin";
# MII Transmiter Constraints: place flip-flops in IOB
INST "*mii0*MII_TXD_?" IOB = TRUE;
INST "*mii0*MII_TX_EN" IOB = TRUE;
INST "*mii0*MII_TX_ER" IOB = TRUE;
TIMESPEC TS_PLB_2_TXPHY0 = FROM PLBCLK TO clk_phy_tx0 40000 ps DATAPATHONLY; #constant
value based on Ethernet clock
TIMESPEC TS_RXPHY0_2_PLB = FROM phy_clk_rx0 TO PLBCLK 10000 ps DATAPATHONLY; #varies
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based on period of PLB clock
TIMESPEC "TS_LL_CLK0_2_RX_CLIENT_CLK0" = FROM LLCLK0 TO clk_client_rx0 8000 ps
DATAPATHONLY; #constant value based on Ethernet clock
TIMESPEC "TS_LL_CLK0_2_TX_CLIENT_CLK0" = FROM LLCLK0 TO clk_client_tx0 8000 ps
DATAPATHONLY; #constant value based on Ethernet clock
TIMESPEC "TS_RX_CLIENT_CLK0_2_LL_CLK0" = FROM clk_client_rx0 TO LLCLK0 10000 ps
DATAPATHONLY; #varies based on period of LocalLink clock
TIMESPEC "TS_TX_CLIENT_CLK0_2_LL_CLK0" = FROM clk_client_tx0 TO LLCLK0 10000 ps
DATAPATHONLY; #varies based on period of LocalLink clock
net "*/hrst*" TIG;
Add:
###### Hard_Ethernet_MAC
# EMAC0 TX Client Clock
NET "*/RGMII_TX_CTL_0*" TNM_NET = "clk_client_tx0";
TIMEGRP "rgmii_client_clk_tx0" = "clk_client_tx0";
TIMESPEC "TS_rgmii_client_clk_tx0" = PERIOD "rgmii_client_clk_tx0" 7800 ps HIGH 50 %;
# EMAC0 RX Client Clock
NET "*/RGMII_RX_CTL_0*" TNM_NET = "clk_client_rx0";
TIMEGRP "rgmii_client_clk_rx0" = "clk_client_rx0";
TIMESPEC "TS_rgmii_client_clk_rx0" = PERIOD "rgmii_client_clk_rx0" 7800 ps HIGH 50 %;
# EMAC0 TX PHY Clock
NET "*/RGMII_TXC_0*" TNM_NET = "clk_phy_tx0";
TIMEGRP "rgmii_phy_clk_tx0" = "clk_phy_tx0";
TIMESPEC "TS_rgmii_phy_clk_tx0" = PERIOD "rgmii_phy_clk_tx0" 7800 ps HIGH 50 %;
# EMAC0 RX PHY Clock
NET "*/RGMII_RXC_0" TNM_NET = "clk_phy_rx0";
TIMEGRP "rgmii_clk_phy_rx0" = "clk_phy_rx0";
TIMESPEC "TS_rgmii_clk_phy_rx0" = PERIOD "rgmii_clk_phy_rx0" 7800 ps HIGH 50 %;
# Set the IDELAY values on the data inputs.
# Please modify to suit your design.
INST "*rgmii0?rgmii_rx_ctl_delay" IOBDELAY_TYPE = FIXED;
INST "*rgmii0?rgmii_rx_d0_delay" IOBDELAY_TYPE = FIXED;
INST "*rgmii0?rgmii_rx_d1_delay" IOBDELAY_TYPE = FIXED;
INST "*rgmii0?rgmii_rx_d2_delay" IOBDELAY_TYPE = FIXED;
INST "*rgmii0?rgmii_rx_d3_delay" IOBDELAY_TYPE = FIXED;
INST "*rgmii_rxc0_delay" IOBDELAY_TYPE = FIXED;
INST "*rgmii0?rgmii_rx_ctl_delay" IDELAY_VALUE = 25;
INST "*rgmii0?rgmii_rx_d0_delay" IDELAY_VALUE = 25;
INST "*rgmii0?rgmii_rx_d1_delay" IDELAY_VALUE = 25;
INST "*rgmii0?rgmii_rx_d2_delay" IDELAY_VALUE = 25;
INST "*rgmii0?rgmii_rx_d3_delay" IDELAY_VALUE = 25;
INST "*rgmii_rxc0_delay" IDELAY_VALUE = 0;
NET "*/LlinkTemac0_CLK*" TNM_NET = "LLCLK";
TIMESPEC "TS_LL_CLK0_2_RX_CLIENT_CLK0" = FROM LLCLK0 TO clk_client_rx0 8000 ps DATAPATHONLY;
TIMESPEC "TS_LL_CLK0_2_TX_CLIENT_CLK0" = FROM LLCLK0 TO clk_client_tx0 8000 ps DATAPATHONLY;
TIMESPEC "TS_RX_CLIENT_CLK0_2_LL_CLK0" = FROM clk_client_rx0 TO LLCLK0 8000 ps DATAPATHONLY;
TIMESPEC "TS_TX_CLIENT_CLK0_2_LL_CLK0" = FROM clk_client_tx0 TO LLCLK0 8000 ps DATAPATHONLY;
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